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Comments
GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION AND THE INTENT OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE
AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the United States Congress will consider a proposed bill
that places controls on the sale of handguns.' This gun control legisla-
tion is commonly known as the "Brady Bill," after former White House
Press Secretary James Brady, who was seriously wounded by a handgun
used in the 1981 assassination attempt on then President Ronald Rea-
gan.2 The Brady Bill mandates that handgun buyers wait seven days
before taking possession of the weapon they wish to purchase. 3 During
the waiting period, local law enforcement officials would be required to
check the criminal background of the potential buyer.4
1. H.R. 277, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
2. See Joan Biskupic, NRA, Gun-Control Supporters Take Aim at Swing Votes, 49
CONG. Q. 604, 604 (1991) [hereinafter Swing Votes]. The official short title of the
legislation is the "Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act." H.R. 277, § 1.
3. H.R. 277, § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
4. See id. § 2(a)(l)(A)(ii)(II). The current legislation is the result of Con-
gressional efforts that began in early 1991. See Joan Biskupic, Crime Bill Faces
House Fight Over Penalties, Appeals, 49 CONG. Q 1898, 1898 (1991) [hereinafter
Biskupic, Crime Bill] (discussing earlier versions of the current gun control legis-
lation). On May 8, 1991, the House passed a version of the Brady Bill. Joan
Biskupic, Brady's Solid House Victory Is Gun-Control Milestone, 49 CONG. Q. 1196,
1196 (1991) [hereinafter Biskupic, House Victory] (reporting passage of H.R. 7,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)). The Senate responded with its own version of the
bill on July 11, 1991. Biskupic, Crime Bill, supra, at 1899 (discussing S. 1241,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
There were three major differences between the initial House and Senate
versions of the bill. Joan Biskupic, Senate Wrestles With Crime Bill, Approves Brady
Compromise, 49 CONG. Q. 1757, 1757 (1991) [hereinafter Biskupic, Brady Compro-
mise]. First, although both bills placed waiting periods on potential handgun
purchasers, the Senate shortened the required waiting period from seven to five
days. Id. Second, the Senate bill mandated that law enforcement authorities
perform background checks on criminal records of potential purchasers during
the waiting period. Id. By contrast, the House bill simply required that local law
enforcement authorities be notified of the purchaser's application to buy a hand-
gun. Id.; see also Joan Biskupic, Sponsors of Gun-Control Bill Vie for Procedural Edge,
49 CONG. Q 1134, 1135 (1991) [hereinafter Biskupic, Procedural Edge]. Third,
the Senate agreed that as soon as the technology became available, an immedi-
ate background check would supplant the five-day waiting period. Biskupic,
Brady Compromise, supra, at 1759. A later House version of legislation mirrorred
the Senate version of the bill. See H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The
House version provided for a five-day waiting period, a criminal background
(1407)
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The possibility of the Brady Bill becoming law has sparked zealous
debate between proponents and opponents of gun control legislation.5
Supporters argue that the Brady Bill will keep guns out of the hands of
criminals and save lives. 6 Opponents of the Brady Bill stress the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms to support the argument that
the Brady Bill will deprive law-abiding citizens of their constitutional
rights. 7 The mounting tension over the issue of gun control will most
likely culminate in a constitutional challenge if the Brady Bill is enacted.
Such a challenge would present the United States Supreme Court with
the first opportunity to consider the scope of the Second Amendment
since its 1939 decision in United States v. Miller.8
check and instantaneous background checks to supplant the five-day period
once such instantaneous checks are available. Id.
The Senate initially passed the Brady Bill as part of a comprehensive crime
bill and sent the entire package to the House for consideration. Biskupic, Crime
Bill, supra, at 1898. In addition to the Brady Bill's handgun controls, the Senate
crime bill included a ban on nine classifications of assault style semi-automatic
weapons. See Joan Biskupic, Senate Passed Crime Bill, 49 CONG. Q 2102, 2130
(199 1) [hereinafter Biskupic, Senate Bill] (providing list of specific types of weap-
ons banned). On October 17, 1991, however, the House voted to strip the as-
sault weapon ban from its version of the crime bill. Holly Idelson, House Members
Duel on Crime; Assault-Gun Ban Is Rejected, 49 CONG. Q. 3038, 3038 (1991). None-
theless, the House did include the original Senate version of the Brady Bill in
the House crime bill. Kitty Dumas, House Republicans Lead Charge to Toughen Anti
Crime Bill, 49 CONG. Q. 3132, 3132 (1991).
5. See Biskupic, Swing Votes, supra note 2, at 604. Various law enforcement
groups as well as Handgun Control Inc., an organization lead by Sarah Brady,
support the bill. Id. Sara Brady is the wife of former White House press secre-
tary James Brady. Id.
On the other side of the debate are groups such as the National Rifle Asso-
ciation (NRA) who feel gun control is a violation of individual rights. Id. at 607.
One member of the NRA has been quoted as saying "[w]e need to have a meat-
eating NRA that won't be kind to any legislator who votes against the citizens'
right to keep and bear arms." Id.
6. See id.
7. Joan Biskupic, Swing Voters Under Pressure As Gun Lobbies Rev Up, 49 CONG.
Q. 1065, 1065 (1991).
8. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (addressing scope of Second
Amendment). In Miller, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National
Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1237 (1934) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5801
(1988)). Id. at 183.
In addition to the National Firearms Act, in 1968 Congress enacted further
gun control legislation as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1988). Federal courts have relied on the
Miller holding to defeat challenges to this legislation. See, e.g., Stevens v. United
States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th. Cir. 1971). For a discussion of these federal court
holdings, see infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, while there have been numerous attacks on state gun control
legislation since Miller, many courts have continued to follow two nineteenth
century Supreme Court cases, Presser v. Illinois and United States v. Cruikshank,
which held that the Second Amendment is not applicable to the states. See
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 253 (1886) (holding "that 'the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,' is a limitation only on the
power of Congress and the national government, and not of the States"); United
2
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II. BACKGROUND
The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 9 The current controversy
surrounding gun control legislation finds its roots in two divergent in-
terpretations of the scope of this Amendment.' 0
First, most federal courts and some commentators adopt a "state's
right view" of the Second Amendment." Many of these courts and
commentators take the position that the Amendment guarantees noth-
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (stating that "[t]he [S]econd
[A]mendment declares that [the right to keep and bear arms] shall not be in-
fringed; but this ... means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Con-
gress"). The Presser and Cruikshank precedent has been followed by Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1180 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 695
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that Second Amendment does not apply to the
states), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), and Fresno Rifle & Gun Club v. Van De
Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (same).
For a detailed discussion and critique of additional cases following Presser
and Cruikshank, see Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning
of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 251-57 & n.201 (1983); Ralph J.
Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U.
L. REV. 53, 66 n.69 (1966). For a critical discussion of the theory that the Sec-
ond Amendment was not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, see Stan-
ford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 652-54
(1989); Rohner, supra, at 66-70.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
10. See Kates, supra note 8, at 206-07 (supporting individual right to keep
and bear arms); Levinson, supra note 8, at 638-42; Roy G. Weatherup, Standing
Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 961, 962-63 (1975) (supporting state's right interpretation of the
Second Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th. Cir. 1971) (inter-
preting Second Amendment as protecting right of states to arm organized mili-
tary units). For a discussion of federal case law supporting the state's right view,
see infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. See also Kates, supra note 8, at 206;
Levinson, supra note 8, at 640-45. Mr. Kates and Professor Levinson both cite
the position of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) as an example of the
state's right view. Kates, supra note 8, at 207-08 & n. 15; Levinson, supra note 8,
at 644. The ACLU's view is that "the individual's right to bear arms applies only
to the preservation of the efficiency of a well regulated militia" and that
"[e]xcept for lawful police and military purposes, the possession of weapons by
individuals is not constitutionally protected." Levinson, supra note 8, at 644
(quoting ACLU, POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Policy
No. 47 (rev. ed. 1992)). Therefore, according to the ACLU, there is no constitu-
tional impediment to the regulation of firearms. See Kates, supra note 8, at 207-
08 & n.15 (citing summary of ACLU meeting of June 14-15, 1980).
In addition, Professor Levinson cites Professor Laurence Tribe's position
that "the history of the [Second] Amendment 'indicate[s] that the central con-
cern of [its] framers was to prevent such federal interferences with the state mili-
tia as would permit the establishment of a standing national army and the
consequent destruction of local autonomy.' " Levinson, supra note 8, at 640 &
n.19 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 299 n.6 (2d
ed. 1988)).
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ing more than the right of states to arm and maintain organized military
units. 12 According to proponents of this view, gun control legislation
does not threaten any individual right of the people.' 3
On the other side of the debate are those who promote an "individ-
ual right view." 14 Supporters of this view argue that the right to keep
and bear arms is an individual right.15 They contend that the only con-
nection between the Second Amendment and the militia is that by pro-
tecting the individual right to keep and bear arms, an effective militia
will be preserved.1 6 Because the Amendment protects the right of indi-
viduals, proponents of the individual right view argue that the Amend-
ment's guarantee extends to the purpose of self-defense.' 7
Judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment has provided lit-
tle guidance as to which of these views is correct, in part because the
Supreme Court's last interpretation of the scope of the Second Amend-
ment was over fifty-three years ago, in United States v. Miller.18 Much of
the twentieth century case law evaluating the scope of the Second
Amendment tends to support the state's right interpretation. 19 This
12. See, e.g., Stevens, 440 F.2d at 144 (holding that Second Amendment ap-
plies only to right of states to arm organized military units). For a discussion of
federal case law supporting the state's right view, see supra notes 32-39. For an
example of commentaries adopting the state's right view of the Second Amend-
ment, see Peter Buck Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second
Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 46, 64 (1966); Weatherup, supra note 10, at 962-63.
In support of the state's right position, one commentator equates the word
"regulated" as used in the Second Amendment with the word "organized." See
Rohner, supra note 8, at 53-55. Professor Rohner claims that the Constitution,
on its face, ties the right to bear arms to an organized militia. Id. at 55. For the text
of the Second Amendment, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. See Kates, supra note 8, at 207 (analyzing state's right view); Levinson,
supra note 8, at 644 (same). This view is based on the preamble to the Second
Amendment, which begins: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State .. " U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also Levinson, supra note
8, at 640 (discussing state's right commentators' reliance on the Second Amend-
ment's preamble (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 299
n.6 (2d ed. 1988)); Kates, supra note 8, at 206 (same).
14. See, e.g., EARL R. KRUSCHKE, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, A
CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 12 (1985) (noting that Second Amendment was
intended to protect individual right to bear arms).
15. Id.
16. Id. ("It was through an attempt to protect the individual that protection
of the militia was achieved. The 'people' referred to in the Amendment are,
therefore, to be viewed as the same people referred to in the first, fourth, ninth,
and tenth amendments ...."); see also Kates, supra note 8, at 213 ("Indeed, the
evidence suggests [that] it was precisely by protecting the individual that the
Framers intended to protect the militia.").
17. Kates, supra note 8, at 206. Professor Kates also argues that the general
populace supports the individual right view. Id. at 206 & n. 11.
18. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a discussion of the Miller opinion, see infra
notes 20-30, 207-16 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th. Cir. 1971)
(holding that there is no individual right to keep and bear arms). For a discus-
1410 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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case law, however, is based on misinterpretations of the Miller deci-
sion. 20 Furthermore, the Miller holding itself is of questionable
validity.2 1
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court addressed the scope of
the Second Amendment in the context of a challenge to the National
Firearms Act of 1934.22 The Miller Court ruled that the Framers of the
Constitution only intended the Second Amendment to ensure the exist-
ence of a well-regulated militia as provided for in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 16 of the Constitution.2 3 Thus, the Court concluded that the
Second Amendment protects only the right to keep and bear arms that
have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia." '24
In some ways the Miller holding appears consistent with the state's
right interpretation of the Second Amendment.2 5 This conclusion is
questionable, however, if one considers the Court's interpretation of
what the Framers of the Constitution meant by the term militia.26 The
sion of federal case law interpreting the Second Amendment, see infra notes 32-
39 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Stevens, 440 F.2d at 149 (misinterpreting Miller and holding that
there is no individual right to keep and bear arms). For a further discussion of
federal case law misinterpreting the Miller holding, see infra notes 32-39.
21. For a discussion of the weaknesses of the Miller holding, see infra notes
30 & 215 and accompanying text.
22. Miller, 307 U.S. at 174. The National Firearms Act prohibits transporta-
tion of certain unregistered weapons in interstate commerce. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(j) (1988); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1988) (defining firearms covered by
act). In Miller, the defendant was convicted of transporting a sawed-off shotgun
in interstate commerce in violation of the Act. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
23. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 16). Article I,
section 8, clause 16 states that Congress shall have the power to "provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
In United States v. Toner, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited Miller
for the proposition that absent some reasonable relationship between the fire-
arm in question and the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,
there is no fundamental right to keep and bear arms. United States v. Toner,
728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp 57, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that to support violation of Second Amendment, activ-
ity infringed must have some reasonable relationship with preservation or effi-
ciency of well-regulated militia), aff'd in part on other grounds, and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
24. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. The Miller Court indicated that its holding re-
ferred to the types of weapons related to militia use at the time of the decision,
as opposed to the types of weapons that were in use when the Second Amend-
ment was drafted. Id. The Supreme Court, in dicta, has twice cited the Miller
holding with approval. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980)
(considering Fifth Amendment due process challenge to gun control legislation
and analogizing to Miller's Second Amendment holding); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Miller as controlling
law on Second Amendment).
25. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79.
26. See id. at 179.
19921 COMMENT 1411
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Court stated that the "[m]ilitia comprised all males physically capable of
acting in concert for the common defense."'2 7 When called to defend
the country, these citizens were to "appear bearing arms supplied by them-
selves and of the kind in common use at the time." 28 Under the Miller
Court's holding, the right to keep and bear arms rests in the hands of
each individual citizen, not the states. 29 However, this right is limited to
the types of arms used for militia purposes. 30
27. Id. The Miller Court explained that the people of the 18th century
"strongly disfavored" standing armies. Id. Thus, the civilian population itself
provided for the national defense and law enforcement. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 178. The Miller Court's interpretation of the word "militia," as
used in the Second Amendment, was probably correct. For a discussion of the
18th century meaning of the word militia, see infra notes 100-01 & 157-68 and
accompanying text. However, it is unclear whether the Miller Court's analysis of
the purpose of the militia, as it relates to the Second Amendment, was correct.
The Court apparently felt that the purpose of the militia was limited to defense
of the nation against insurrection and foreign invasion. See Miller, 307 U.S. at
178-79 (stating that weapon must be part of ordinary military equipment or be
able to contribute to common defense to be protected under Second
Amendment).
In addition to providing for the national defense, however, the Framers and
state constitutions cited other purposes for the right to keep and bear arms. See,
e.g., PA. CONST. OF 1776, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Common-
wealth, or State of Pennsylvania, 13th declaration [hereinafter PA. CONST. OF 1776]
(expressly including self-defense as purpose for right to keep and bear arms),
repealed by PA. CONST. OF 1790, reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 265-66, 342 (1980). For a discussion of the historical pur-
poses of the right to keep and bear arms, see infra notes 45-202 and accompany-
ing text.
In addition, in Cases v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
questioned the validity of the Miller holding just three years after the Supreme
Court handed down the decision. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), and cert. denied, 324 U.S. 889 (1945).
The Cases court disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision to apply the pro-
tection of the right to keep arms only to the types of arms used in military ser-
vice. Id. (questioning civilian possession of "machine guns, trench mortars,
[and] anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns"). The Cases court stated that the Miller
opinion did not "formulate a general rule applicable to all cases." Id. at 922.
Instead, according to the Cases court, the rule in Miller "was adequate to dispose
of the case before it." Id. The Cases court determined that if the Miller opinion
intended to protect an individual's right to bear arms that have some reasonable
relation to the maintenance and preservation of a militia, then the Second
Amendment's protection would be "absolute." Id. (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at
178). The Cases court explained that "some sort of military use seems to have
been found for almost any modern lethal weapon." Id. Thus, if the Miller deci-
sion were followed at the present day, "the federal government would be em-
powered to regulate the possession or use of ... only weapons which can be
classed as antiques." Id. In United States v. Warin, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit cited Cases with approval, stating: "If the logical extension of the
defendant's argument for extending the holding of Miller was inconceivable in
1942, it is completely irrational in this time of nuclear weapons." United States
v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
1412 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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Since 1939, federal courts have misinterpreted the Miller holding.
3 1
In 1971, the Sixth Circuit, in Stevens v. United States,32 cited Miller as sup-
porting the state's right view. 3 3 The Stevens court declared that under
Miller, "the Second Amendment right 'to keep and bear Arms' applies
only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individ-
ual's right to bear arms."' 34 The First, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals, as well as a District Court for the Southern District of
Texas have adopted the same position. 35
31. For a discussion of federal case law misinterpreting the Miller holding,
see infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
32. 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971)
33. See id. at 149.
34. Id. In Stevens, the Sixth Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant for
violating the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which pro-
hibits felons from carrying firearms. Id. at 145 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988))). Moreover, in 1976, the Sixth
Circuit reaffirmed its position that the Second Amendment is limited to a state's
right. See Warin, 530 F.2d at 106 (citing Stevens as limiting the Miller holding to
provide for collective right to bear arms).
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's position, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has upheld a conviction under the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act without limiting the holding of Miller to the state's right view.
See United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972). The Synnes court stated that prohibiting felons
from carrying firearms did not impede the efficiency of a well-regulated militia
and, therefore, the Omnibus Crime Control Act was constitutional under Miller.
Id. Since Synnes, however, the Eight Circuit has adopted the state's right view.
See United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (analyzing Sec-
ond Amendment "purely in terms of protecting state militia, rather than individ-
ual rights").
35. See United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (ana-
lyzing Second Amendment "purely in terms of protecting state militia, rather
than individual rights"); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir.
1974) (holding that Second Amendment confers only collective right to bear
arms); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D.N.H. 1981) (specif-
ically limiting Second Amendment to state's right to arm its militia), aff'd, 740
F.2d 952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984); Eckert v. Pennsylvania, 331
F. Supp. 1361, 1362 (E.D. Pa.) (finding that "the Second Amendment was not
adopted to guarantee the right of the individual to bear arms, but rather to pro-
tect the states in the maintenance of their militia organizations against possible
encroachments of the federal power"), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 989, and cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); Vietnamese Fisherman's
Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 210 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(finding that right to keep and bear arms is not individual right and may only be
exercised in connection with militia "organized by the state" (emphasis added)).
Notably, prior to Nelson, the Eighth Circuit had taken a less restrictive view
of the Second Amendment. See Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972). In Cody, the Eight Circuit held that gun
control legislation is constitutional unless it obstructs the maintenance of a well-
regulated militia. Id. The court did not, however, restrict the right to the state's
right to arm the militia. See id.; see also United States v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164,
167 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that legislation requiring sellers to keep records of
gun sales does not infringe on Second Amendment right to bear arms); United
States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that legislation re-
7
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The state's right position, however, is not supported by the Miller
opinion, which states that the civilians themselves would supply the arms
used by the militia, not the states.3 6 The federal courts' interpretations
of the Miller opinion as protecting the state's right to maintain a militia
are erroneous. Nonetheless, as recently as 1990, the District Court for
the Eastern District of California applied the state's right view in Fresno
Rifle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp.37 The Fresno court upheld a California
state gun control statute on the ground that the Second Amendment
does not apply to state legislation. 38 Moreover, the district court stated
that even if the Second Amendment does apply to state legislation, the
Amendment does not protect individual rights. 39
These cases, as well as most commentators on the state's right and
individual right views of the Second Amendment, are based primarily on
different interpretations of the Second Amendment's original intent.40
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate these interpretations
through an independent examination of the historical antecedents of the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
First, Part III of this Comment examines the common law history of
the right to keep and bear arms. 4 l Part IV then discusses the legislative
history of the Second Amendment. 4 2 Finally, Part V considers the views
of some of the major political figures of the late eighteenth century.4 3
stricting possession of firearms will not be invalidated if the court sees no con-
flict between the legislation and the Second Amendment), vacated on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972).
36. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
37. 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1417 (E.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.
1992).
38. Id. at 1417-18 (upholding constitutionality of assault weapons ban).
39. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also has taken this
position with regard to state gun control legislation. See Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding complete ban
on handguns), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
40. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The
Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 13 (1982). Mr.
Halbrook devoted his article, which supports an individual right to keep and
bear arms, to an examination of the Second Amendment's history. Id. Mr.
Kates, however, noted that the origins, and perhaps fallacies, of the individual
right view have not been subject to much scrutiny, because supporters of this
view concentrate on rebutting the state's right view, and not on formulating
their own arguments. Kates, supra note 8, at 209-11. Thus, it is unclear to what
extent individual right supporters rely on the Second Amendment's legislative
history to support their argument. Id. Mr. Kates himself is an individual right
advocate who relied primarily on historical evidence to support his argument.
See id. at 211-43 & nn.31-167 (providing historical analysis of Second
Amendment).
41. For a discussion of the common law history of the right to keep and
bear arms, see infra notes 45-72 and accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Second Amendment,
see infra notes 73-142 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of the views of some of the major political figures of
1414 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/4
After determining whether there is an individual right to keep and bear
arms, Part VI presents a proposed constitutional analysis of federal gun
control legislation. 4 4
III. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
A. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in England
An examination of the development of the right to keep and bear
arms in England is essential to an understanding of the origin of the
same right in the United States. The American Colonial Charters, which
had a substantial impact on the American Bill of Rights, were largely
based on the English Bill of Rights.4 5 Many colonial charters declared
that Americans retained all rights possessed by the English.4 6
The English right to keep arms dates back as far as 870 A.D., when
British laws required all free men to own arms and be prepared to de-
fend the nation.4 7 In an effort to put England under Catholic control,
the eighteenth century, see infra notes 143-202 and accompanying text. A his-
torical analysis of a constitutional right is only one way to determine its applica-
tion. Levinson, supra note 8, at 643-57 (noting that Second Amendment may be
interpreted using: (1) textual argument, (2) historical argument, (3) structural
argument, (4) doctrinal argument, (5) prudential argument, or (6) ethical argu-
ment (citing PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982))). The Second
Amendment, while generating "much political controlversy," has been the sub-
ject of little historical scholarship. Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the
Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: Pre-Revolutionary Origins of the Second Amendment,
15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91, 91 (1989).
44. For a proposed constitutional analysis of federal gun control legisla-
tion, see infra notes 203-68 and accompanying text.
45. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 49.
46. Id. The Virginia Colonial Charter of 1606 contained a provision which
declared that the people of Virginia possess "all the Liberties, Privileges,
Franchises and Immunities that have at any Time been held, enjoyed and pos-
sessed by the people of Great Britain." Id. at 53 (emphasis added). A similar
guarantee was provided in. the New England Charter of 1620, the Massachusetts
Bay Charter of 1629, the Maryland Charter of 1632, the Connecticut Charter of
1662, the Rhode Island Charter of 1663, the Carolina Charter of 1663, and the
Georgia Charter of 1732. Id. Moreover, Patrick Henry made an identical decla-
ration in his resolves of 1765. Id. at 49.
In addition, when Great Britain began to increase its military presence in
the American Colonies during the mid-eighteenth century, Massachusetts
"call[ed] upon its citizens to arm themselves in defense." SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
THE CONST. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., RE-
PORT ON THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 4 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE] (collection of scholarly articles on Second
Amendment and analysis by subcommittee). In support of their right to take up
arms, the people of Massachusetts reasoned that because they were British sub-
jects, they were entitled to all of the rights guaranteed under the English Bill of
Rights. Id.
47. KRUSCHKE, supra note 14, at 7. Because England did not have a stand-
ing army at that time, it was necessary to have an armed population for defense
of the nation. Id. at 8. In addition to laws that provided for the national de-
1992] COMMENT 1415
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however, during the seventeenth century, King Charles II enacted legis-
lation that gave him a pretense to disarm the English people. 48 Charles'
successor, KingJames II, continued this disarmament until he was over-
thrown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.4 9
Following the Glorious Revolution, the British Parliament drafted
the English Bill of Rights of 1689.50 This document declared that "rais-
ing or keeping a standing army in time of peace, unless it be with the
consent of Parliament, is against the law; that the subjects which are
Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions
and as allowable by law." ' 5 1 The bill was promulgated in response to the
various acts of King James II that were taken to
subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and
liberties of [the English] kingdom by ... raising and keeping a
standing army ... in time of peace without consent of parlia-
ment ... [and] causing several good subjects being Protestants
to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed
and employed contrary to law .... 52
This passage illustrates that the English right to keep and bear arms
evolved from the need to prevent future abuses of the people's liberties
by the Crown.5 3
fense, the Laws of Alfred (871-899 A.D.) recognized the right to possess arms
for all nonviolent acts. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 37 (1984); see also REPORT OF THE SUB-
COMMITrEE, supra note 46, at 1 (discussing impact of Laws of Alfred). The Stat-
ute of Winchester, 1285 A.D., also required law abiding citizens to keep arms.
DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 14-19(1986) (citing Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1285) (Eng.)).
48. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE, supra note 46, at 2; HARDY, supra note
47, at 30-31. The Militia Act of 1662 gave Charles 11 the power to disarm those
persons judged "dangerous to the peace of the kingdom." HARDY, supra note
47, at 30 (citing Militia Act of 1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng)). In addition, the
English Game Acts, which purported to limit the keeping of arms to kill game,
actually barred most nonproperty owners from keeping arms. Id. at 32 (citing
Game Act of 1671, 22 & 23 Car. II, ch. 25 (Eng.)). For further discussion of the
Game Acts and their use to disarm the people, see Kates, supra note 8, at 235-36.
49. HARDY, supra note 47, at 35; see also REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMrITEE, supra
note 46, at 3 (discussing Glorious Revolution); 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 40
(same).
50. HARDY, supra note 47, at 35; 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 41.
51. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 43 (citing English Bill of Rights of 1689).
In addition to drafting a right to bear arms into the Bill of Rights, Parliament
amended the Game Acts to omit guns from a list of prohibited weapons. RE-
PORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 3; see also HARDY, supra note 47, at
38 (discussing Game Acts (citing 4 & 5 Win. & Mary, ch. 23 (1692) (Eng.); 5
Ann, ch. 14 (1705) (Eng.))).
52. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 42 (quoting statement accompanying
English Bill of Rights of 1689).
53. Id. This Comment will demonstrate that fear of deprivation of liberty
through disarmament was also a driving force behind the American right to keep
1416 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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This purpose, defending liberty, does not contradict either the
state's right view or the individual right view. 54 The people of the
United States could achieve independence from the threat of tyranny by
the federal government either by having an armed state militia or by
allowing individuals to maintain private arms.
Defense of liberty, however, was not the only reason given in sup-
port of the English right to keep arms. 55 Courts and commentators rec-
ognized at least three other purposes supporting the right to keep and
bear arms in England. In post-Bill of Rights prosecutions for unlawful
possession of firearms, the King's Bench upheld the right to keep arms
for personal defense. 5 6 The court defined personal defense to include
self-defense, defense of property and all other lawful purposes. 57 Com-
mentaries of eighteenth century English legal officials further evidence a
belief that the right to keep and bear arms extended to enforcement of
local laws and defense against foreign invaders. 58
and bear arms. For a discussion of the origins of the American right to keep and
bear arms, see infra notes 62-202 and accompanying text.
54. State's right advocates have argued that even if the English Bill of
Rights had an effect on the American Bill of Rights, the English Bill of Rights
does not support an individual right to bear arms. See Rohner, supra note 8, at
59. Professor Rohner contended that the English right to keep and bear arms
was limited to a collective right of the populace to defend against military action
by the government. Id. Even if Professor Rohner is correct, however, his argu-
ment raises the question: Who was to supply these arms? Because there were
no state governments in England, the source of arms must have been the indi-
vidual citizens themselves. Therefore, even if the English right to keep and bear
arms was limited to the use of arms for collective purposes, the possession of arms
by individuals was not limited. For a discussion of the state's right view, see
supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of other purposes for the right to keep and bear arms
in England, see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. See Wingfield v. Stratford, 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1752) (upholding
right to keep arms for variety of purposes).
57. Stratford, 96 Eng. Rep. at 787. In Stratford, the bench stated that because
"guns are not expressly mentioned in the [Game Acts] ... and as a gun may be kept
for the defense of a man's house, and for diverse other lawful purposes, it [is necessary for
a conviction] to allege ... that the gun had been used for killing game." Id.; see
also Mallock v. Eastly, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370, 1374 (K.B. 1744) ("The mere having
a gun was no offense within the game laws, for a man may keep a gun for the
defense of his house and family, but the party must use the gun to kill game
before he can incur any penalty."); King v. Gardner, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1241
(K.B. 1739) (holding that to obtain conviction under Game Acts, defendant must
have actually used gun to kill game; mere possession of gun is not prohibited).
58. See HARDY, supra note 47, at 39-40 (citing W. BLIZZARD, DESULTORY RE-
FLECTIONS ON POLICE (London, 1785)). Mr. Hardy quoted the following state-
ment of the Recorder of London, the chief legal official in London during the
18th century:
The right of his Majesty's protestant subjects to have arms for their
own defense, and to use them for lawful purposes, is most clear and
undeniable.... And that this right which every protestant most unques-
tionable possesses individually may, and in many cases must, be exer-
cised collectively, is likewise a point which I conceive to be most clearly
11
Wagner: Gun Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: T
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
1418 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1407
As noted above, colonial Americans took the position that they re-
tained all rights possessed by the English.59 At least one of the four
purposes for the right to keep and bear arms established by the English
Bill of Rights-self-defense--contradicts the state's right view that the
individual right to bear arms is limited to militia or collective pur-
poses.60 State's right advocates ignore the evidence provided by case
law and English legal officials that recognize an individual right to bear
arms.
6 1
B. Development of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
in Pre-Constitution America
1. The Colonial Charters
Like the English statutes discussed above, several American colonial
charters had provisions requiring citizens to keep arms. 62 Even though
established.... The lawful purposes for which such arms may be used
(besides immediate self-defense) are the suppression of violent and fe-
lonious breaches of the peace, the assistance of the civil magistrates in
the execution of the laws, and the defense of the kingdom against for-
eign invaders.
Id. at 39. These statements and case law following promulgation of the English
Bill of Rights establish a variety of purposes for the right to keep and bear arms.
59. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 49. For a discussion of the American
colonial charters and other documents in which Americans declared that they
retained all rights held by Englishmen, see supra note 46.
60. For a discussion of the state's right view, see supra notes 11-13 and ac-
companying text.
61. Kates, supra note 8, at 206. State's right advocates have cited the state-
ment accompanying the provision in the English Bill of Rights as providing the
only purpose for the right to keep and bear arms in England. See Rohner, supra
note 8, at 59; Weatherup, supra note 10, at 974. Based on this statement, state's
right advocates have concluded that the English right to keep and bear arms was
limited to "collective" or "militia" purposes. Weatherup, supra note 10, at 974.
Mr. Weatherup opined that "[t]here was obviously no recognition of any per-
sonal right to bear arms on the part of subjects generally." Id. He argued that
"[tihere was no individual right to bear arms; the rights of subjects could be
protected only by the political process and the fundamental laws of the land."
Id. Most federal courts that have considered the issue have adopted the state's
right view. For a discussion of federal case law interpreting the Second Amend-
ment, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
62. See REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 3 (concluding that
these laws resulted from availability of hunting and need for defense in colo-
nies); see also Kates, supra note 8, at 215-16 (same).
In 1623, Virginia forbade its citizens from traveling without carrying arms.
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 3. In 1658, the state required
every household to have a firearm, and in 1673, the Virginia colonial govern-
ment agreed to loan money to those households that could not afford a firearm.
Id. Similarly, Massachusetts required all freemen to own firearms. Id. Those
who did not own a firearm could be fined. Id. Furthermore, with the British
military buildup in America in the late eighteenth century, several colonies
called upon their citizens to take up arms, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
180-81 (1939) (discussing common law history of right to bear arms). In 1784,
Massachusetts organized a militia in which every man was responsible for pro-
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/4
these provisions required individuals to own arms, many states contin-
ued to regulate possession of arms as was necessary to maintain public
safety. 6 3 Thus, while the American colonial charters provide evidence
supporting an individual right to keep and bear arms, they also provide
early evidence of gun control legislation.
2. The State Constitutions
After the adoption of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, sev-
eral of the colonies adopted constitutions of their own.6 4 The constitu-
tions of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Vermont all included
provisions that guaranteed the right to bear arms. 6 5 The purposes of
these provisions appear to match those adopted by the English Parlia-
ment in 1689.66
Pennsylvania's Constitution, adopted in 1776, provided in part:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence [sic]
of themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time
of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up;
viding his own firearm. Id. New York and Virginia followed shortly thereafter
with similar laws. Id. Commentators have argued that these charters provide
clear evidence that the right to keep and bear arms extends beyond the keeping
of arms for use in militia service. See Kates, supra note 8, at 215. Mr. Kates
suggested that some states required even those citizens not eligible for militia
service to keep arms. Id. (citing THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 42
(M. Ferrard ed., 1929)).
In addition, many state charters declared that Americans retained all rights
held by Englishmen, including the right to bear arms for personal use. For a
discussion of other state charters declaring that Americans retained rights pos-
sessed by the English, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, For a discus-
sion of the English right to keep and bear arms, see supra notes 45-61 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, some state's right advocates have argued that
the drafters of the colonial charters included a right to bear arms only because
they were concerned with providing for the common defense by a local militia,
rather than military rule. Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at 52-53. These com-
mentators apparently ignore the evidence discussed above.
63. See John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American
Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148, 149-50 (1971). Professor Levin explained:
[The] duty to keep and bear arms was limited by the interest of colonial
governments in preventing the use of firearms for harmful ends. ... To
provide against Negro insurrections, Virginia forbade Negroes from
carrying arms without their masters' certificate. Pennsylvania had a sim-
ilar provision by 1700, and South Carolina even required that the
master keep all arms not in use safely locked up in his house.
Id. at 149 (citations omitted). Professor Levin also cited colonial laws forbidding
the use of guns in an area where a person or livestock might be wounded or
killed, and a Pennsylvania statute forbidding the firing of a gun in Philadelphia
without a special license from the governor. Id. at 150 (citing, inter alia, Penn.
Stat., ch. 245, § 4 (1721)).
64. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 245, 265, 342.
65. Id.
66. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 41 (discussing text of English Bill of
Rights of 1689).
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And that the military should be kept under strict subordination
to, and governed by, the civil power.6 7
This provision echoes three of the four established purposes supporting
the right to keep and bear arms in England. 68 The provision expressly
provides for the right to keep and bear arms for both self-defense and
the common defense. 69 Furthermore, the provision also contains a
clause evidencing fear of standing armies and recognizing the danger
such armies present to the liberty of the people. 70
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides direct evidence that the
American colonists, after declaring independence from Great Britain,
continued to fear that extensive military power in the hands of govern-
ment would lead to despotism. 7' Both the American colonists and the
67. PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 266. The
Pennsylvania Constitution currently provides that "[tihe right of the citizens to
bear arms for defense of themselves and the state shall not be questioned." PA.
CONST. art. I, § 21.
In addition, the Vermont Constitution, adopted in 1777, contains a right to
bear arms provision identical to the original provision in the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1776. See VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16.
68. For a discussion of the purposes of the English right to keep and bear
arms, see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
69. PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 266.
Commentators Feller and Gotting argue that the terms "defense of themselves
and the state" is not a reference to individual self-defense. Feller & Gotting,
supra note 12, at 54-55. Instead, Feller and Gotting contend that the self-de-
fense provision guaranteed that all of the people could collectively take up arms
to defend their lives. Id. They contend that "the defense of the state" provision
referred to protection of the political framework and state sovereignty. Id.
However, this interpretation is problematic in light of the provision that a sub-
stantial minority of the Pennsylvania legislature recommended be added to the
Federal Constitution. 3 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 657. The Pennsylvania pro-
vision added hunting to the list of proper uses of arms, indicating that the use of
arms extended to personal as well as collective purposes. Id. Unless the Penn-
sylvania legislature intended the right to keep and bear arms provision in the
federal Constitution to be different in scope than the sister provision in the state
constitution, it is unlikely that the Pennsylvania right to keep and bear arms was
limited to collective purposes.
70. PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 266.
71. Id. The concept of an armed populace protecting against despotism is
inconsistent with the state's right view. For a discussion of the view of some
state's right proponents and many federal courts that the right to keep and bear
arms is limited to a state's right to arm organized military units, see supra notes
11-13 & 32-39 and accompanying text.
The purpose of the original right to bear arms was to protect the people
against military institutions under the control of the government. State's right
supporters claim that the Second Amendment provided for the arming and
maintenance of such units by the state governments. While the colonists feared
organized military forces under the control of the federal government, provi-
sions barring government control of the military in three state constitutions in-
dicate that the people also feared military units under the control of the state
governments. See MAss. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 30, at 337; PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at
266; VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 16.
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English Parliament countered this possibility by restricting the govern-
ment's power over the military and by guaranteeing the people the right
to keep and bear arms. 72
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The Debates at the Constitutional Convention
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers heatedly debated
whether to include provisions giving Congress the power to regulate
and call forth the militia. 7 3 The debate centered on how to provide for
adequate defense of the nation while maintaining individual liberties.74
To prevent the federal government from using the militia to usurp the
liberty of the people, opponents of the militia provisions believed that
the delegates should leave the power to regulate the militia with the
states. 7 5 On the other hand, George Mason and James Madison argued
that the defense of the nation depended on having either uniform regu-
lation of the militia or a standing army.76
72. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 30, at 337; PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at
266. The Massachusetts Constitution, adopted in 1789, states that "[tihe people
have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense." MAss. CONST.
pt.1, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 337. At first glance,
state's right supporters would cite the Massachusetts right to bear arms provi-
sion to support their position that the right is a collective one, exercisable by the
state only, and only to arm its militia. However, immediately following the sen-
tence giving the people the right to bear arms, the Massachusetts Constitution
provides: "And as in a time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought
to not be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military
power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and
be governed by it." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 30, at 342-43. The drafters felt that the people could not trust the Massa-
chusetts government with the power to control the military; therefore, it was
unlikely that the people would depend on that government to arm the militia. It
is more likely that the drafters intended the "right of the people to keep and
bear arms for the common defense" to be an individual right to keep arms, but
they limited the use of these arms to providing for the common defense through
a system of civil defense.
73. JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 590 (E.
H. Scott ed., 1893); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (giving Congress power
"[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for gov-
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con-
gress"); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress power to call forth
militia).
74. MADISON, supra note 73, at 590.
75. Id. For example, Eldridge Gerry, a representative of Massachusetts,
queried: "Will any man say that liberty will be safe in the hands of eighty or an
[sic] hundred men [of the national legislature] taken from the whole continent,
as in the hands of two or three hundred taken from a single State?" Id.
76. Id. at 555, 590-92. George Mason believed that a balance could be
struck between the interests of the states and the need for national defense. Id.
15
Wagner: Gun Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: T
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Madison eventually convinced the delegation to include a provision
giving Congress the power to regulate the militia. 7 7 Madison argued
that having a federally regulated militia would actually be the best way to
ensure that the government did not infringe upon the liberty of the peo-
ple. 78 He reasoned that without an effective militia, the government
would have to form a standing army to defend the nation.79 Madison
proposed that the Framers give the responsibility of providing for an
effective militia to the federal government because he believed that the
states could not sustain such a militia. 80
The delegates' compromise at the Constitutional Convention re-
at 555. Mason proposed that Congress have the power to regulate and disci-
pline the militia, but that the power to appoint officers be left with the states. Id.
However, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut felt that Mason's proposal went
too far. Id. at 556-57. Ellsworth proposed that the government have the power
to regulate the militia only on two occasions. Id. at 556. First, the government
should regulate the militia when the militia was in actual service of the federal
government. Id. Second, the government should regulate the militia if the
states failed to provide regulations on their own. Id. Ellsworth stated that the
power over the militia should not be taken from the states, "whose [significance]
would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice of power." Id. Furthermore,
Ellsworth believed that even if the delegates recommended giving Congress this
power, the states would never accept such a system of regulation. Id. at 557.
Ellsworth was not alone. Id. at 556-57. John Dickinson of Delaware con-
tended that the states never would, nor ought to, give up their power to regulate
the militia. Id. Dickinson suggested that the bulk of the power over the militia
should remain with the states. Id. He thought the drafters should give the fed-
eral government power over only one-fourth of the militia on a rotating basis.
Id. Roger Sherman of Connecticut also agreed that the states would not give up
their militia. Id. Sherman argued that the states wanted to maintain their militia
to defend against insurrections and enforce their laws. Id.
Notably, the militia to which the delegates were referring is not akin to the
National Guard of modern times. See The Debates in the Convention of the Common-
wealth of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter Virginia De-
bates], in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1859) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Madison and Mason were referring
to the militia as the entire body of the people. Id. For a discussion of Mason's
view on the militia, see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of the meaning of the word militia, see REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE, supra note 46, at 7; Kates, supra note 8, at 214-18; Levinson, supra note 8, at
246-47.
77. MADISON, supra note 73, at 590-92.
78. Id. at 590-92.
79. Id. Madison contended that the best way to prevent a standing army
was to render it unnecessary by providing in the Constitution for an "effectual
provision for a good militia." Id. at 592.
80. Id. at 590-92. Madison argued that the states had neglected their militia
in the past. Id. at 590-91. He felt that after consolidation of the states into a
union, the states would depend even less on their own military units for safety.
Id. If this occurred, the entire nation would lack an adequate defense. Id. Be-
cause discipline of the militia was a national concern, Madison believed that the
Constitution ought to provide for federal regulation of the militia. Id. For a
discussion of the debates on the adoption of the militia clauses, see Weatherup,
supra note 10, at 980-84.
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garding which body of government should regulate the militia is un-
doubtedly one of the main reasons the Bill of Rights included the right
to keep and bear arms, and is probably the origin of the preamble, "[a]
well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State."'8 1
This Comment demonstrates, however, that it is unlikely that the Fram-
ers simply intended that the right to keep and bear arms would insure
that an armed militia existed to provide for the common defense. 8 2
B. The State Ratification Conventions
Thirteen states voted on ratification of the Constitution. 83 Eight
states recommended amendments; of those, five sought guarantees for
the right to keep and bear arms.84 The most illuminating debates with
regard to the right to keep and bear arms occurred at the Virginia
Convention.8 5
81. U.S. CONST. amend. II. For a discussion of the state ratification debates
and the comments of various 18th century political figures, see infra notes 83-
202 and accompanying text.
82. It is more likely that the right to keep and bear arms was intended to
provide the people with a check against the government's power over the military.
After a majority of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention approved the
Constitution, it was sent to the states for ratification. For a discussion of the
state ratification conventions, see infra notes 83-125 and accompanying text.
One of the main topics of debate at the state conventions was whether the pro-
posed Constitution provided the federal government with tremendous power
over the militia without ensuring that the rights and liberties of the people
would be protected. MADISON, supra note 73, at 590-91. George Mason, who
was instrumental in securing congressional regulation of the militia at the Con-
stitutional Convention, did not sign the proposed Constitution because the dele-
gates did not include a bill of rights. See Objections of the Hon. George Mason, One of
the Delegates in the Late Continental Convention, To the proposed Federal Constitution;
Assigned as His Reasons for Not Signing the Same, extracted in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 76, at 494. The debates between the supporters of the new Constitu-
tion and their opponents demonstrate that the people needed arms to defend
against the federal government's potential abuse of its regulatory power over
the armed militia. For a discussion of the Federalist Papers and the writings of the
Anti-Federalists, see infra notes 143-202 and accompanying text.
83. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 319.
84. 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 983. New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Rhode Island and Virginia recommended including a right to keep and
bear arms provision. 4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 912; see also 1 ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES, supra note 76, at 326-28. Furthermore, a substantial minority of the
Pennsylvania delegates also recommended that the First Congress add a right to
keep and bear arms provision to the federal Constitution. 3 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 30, at 658; see also REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE, supra note 46, at 5. In
Massachusetts, Samuel Adams unsuccessfully pushed for an amendment provid-
ing "[t]hat the said Constitution shall never be construed to authorize Congress
to infringe the just liberty of the press or the rights of conscience; or to prevent
the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own
arms." REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 6 (emphasis added).
85. See Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 68-86.
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1. The Virginia Debates
The Virginia Convention was led, in large part, by James Madison
and George Mason.86 Thus, it is not surprising that a substantial por-
tion of the debates centered on Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the
Constitution.8 7 Mason, who supported this provision at the Constitu-
tional Convention, nonetheless argued that the Framers should place
checks on Congress' power over the militia.88 One of Mason's proposed
checks was on Congress' power to arm the militia.8 9 Mason thought
that there was a danger that this power could be interpreted as giving
Congress the exclusive power to arm the militia. 90 Congress thus could
destroy the militia by refusing to invoke its Article I, Section 8 power to
arm the militia. 9 1 Mason believed that if the militia was neglected, and
thereby disarmed, Congress would have an excuse to establish a stand-
ing army.9 2 The government could then use the standing army to strip
unarmed and defenseless people of their liberty.9 3 Therefore, Mason,
an Anti-Federalist, proposed that Congress amend the Constitution to
give the states the express power to arm the militia if Congress failed to
86. See generally id., in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76.
87. Id., in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 378-428.
88. Id., in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 380.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Mason stated:
Should the national government wish to render the militia useless, they
may neglect them, and let them perish, in order to have a pretence [sic]
of establishing a standing army .... [O]nce a standing army is estab-
lished . . . the people lose their liberty. When against a regular and
disciplined army, yeomanry are the only defense,-yeomanry, unskillful
and unarmed .... Forty years ago, when the resolution of enslaving
America was formed in Great Britain, the British Parliament was ad-
vised by an artful man, who was governor of Pennsylvania, [Sir William
Keith], to disarm the people; that it was the best and most effectual way
to enslave them;.., and let them sink gradually, by totally disusing and
neglecting the militia.
Id., in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 379-80 (emphasis added). Note that
Mason's concerns are consistent with the position he took at the Constitutional
Convention in favor of giving the Congress regulatory power over the militia.
MADISON, supra note 73, at 551. For a discussion of the debates at the Constitu-
tional Convention, see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison also stated that a well-
regulated militia was necessary to avoid forming a standing army to provide for
the national defense. MADISON, supra note 73, at 590-92. George Mason did not
disagree with James Madison on this point. Id. Rather, Mason was concerned
that Congress' power over the militia was subject to abuse. In fact, at the Vir-
ginia Convention, Mason stated that were it not for the possibility that Congress'
power to arm the militia would be interpreted as exclusive, he would have sup-
ported Article I, Section 8, Clause 16. Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 76, at 380.
92. Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 380.
93. Id.
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do so.9
4
The debates at the Virginia Convention lend some support to the
state's right view of gun control. 95 State's right proponents contend
that the right to bear arms is limited to the states' right to arm their
militia. 9 6 In fact, George Mason and Patrick Henry both suggested that
the states have the express power to arm the militia in order to avoid
federal disarmament. 9 7 Some state's right proponents, however, inter-
94. Id. James Madison believed that Congress' power to arm the militia
under Section 8 of Article I did not bar the states from arming their own militia;
therefore, Mason's concerns were unwarranted. Id., in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 76, at 381. At the Constitutional Convention, Madison contended that
Congress' power to arm the militia did not extend to the actual furnishing of
arms. See MADISON, supra note 73, at 589. The debates at the Constitutional
Convention support Madison's position. Id. Rufus King, a representative of
Massachusetts, proposed that arming the militia would produce two results. Id.
First, King contended that arming the militia would mean specifying the kind,
size and caliber of weapons the militia could hold. Id. Second, arming the mili-
tia would mean regulating the mode of furnishing arms; either by the militia
themselves, the state governments or the national treasury. Id.
Notwithstanding Madison's and King's arguments, some of the Framers
were skeptical of the militia provisions as drafted. Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 76, at 384-93, 395-99. For example, Patrick Henry sup-
ported Mason, stating "[t]he great object is, that every man be armed." Id., in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 386. Henry proposed that no harm would
be done by expressly stating in the Constitution that the Framers intended the
power to arm the militia to be held concurrently by both the state and federal
governments. Id., in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 399. Thus, even
though the legislative history of Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 supports
Madison's view that the right of Congress to arm the militia was not intended to
be exclusive, many feared that it would be interpreted as being so. Id., in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 384-93, 395-99.
95. For a discussion of the views of George Mason and Patrick Henry, see
Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 384-93, 395-99.
96. See, e.g., Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at 60 (adopting state's right
view).
97. See Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 384-93, 395-
99 (discussing views of George Mason and Patrick Henry); see also Feller & Got-
ting, supra note 12, at 60. Feller and Gotting argue that the Second Amend-
ment's adoption was "clearly designed to placate Mason, Henry and others"
who argued that the states should have the right to arm their militia. Id. Unlike
the drafters of many other state constitutions, there is evidence that the drafters
of the Virginia Constitution did not fear disarmament at the hands of the state.
See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 232-35. The Virginia Constitution, which was
drafted primarily by George Mason, did not contain a right to keep and bear
arms provision. Id. Thomas Jefferson wanted to include a constitutional provi-
sion providing that "[n]o free man shall be debarred the use of arms [within his
own lands or tenements]." Id. at 245. The legislature, however, rejected Jeffer-
son's proposal and adopted Mason's constitution, which did not contain a right
to bear arms provision. Id. at 245. The omission of a right to keep and bear
arms provision from the Virginia Constitution may indicate that, while the Vir-
ginia legislature feared federal disarmament of the people, it did not fear dis-
armament at the hands of the state. For a discussion of state constitutions
containing a right to keep and bear arms provision, see supra notes 64-72 and
accompanying text.
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pret the right to keep and bear arms as being further limited to the arm-
ing of organized military forces. 98 The Virginia debates do not support
this view.9 9 Mason's militia consisted of the entire body of the people of
each state.10 0 Thus, defense by the militia meant civil defense, not de-
fense by organized military units under the control of the state.' 0 '
Hence, even if the right to bear arms is limited to a state's right, it is a
state's right to arm the people, not to arm organized military units. 10 2
Moreover, even though the debates at the Virginia Convention sug-
gest that the right to keep and bear arms may rest with the states, the
language used in the constitutional amendment that the Virginia delega-
tion recommended suggests that the right rests with the people.10 3 The
98. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at 64. Feller and Gotting argue that
"the term 'well regulated militia' must be taken to mean the active, organized
militia of each state, which today is categorized as the state National Guard." Id.
In addition to commentators, most federal courts take this position. See, e.g.,
Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971) (adopting state's right
view). For a discussion of federal case law adopting the state's right view, see
supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of why the Virginia debates do not support this view,
see infra notes 100-05.
100. Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 425. George
Mason stated that "[a] worthy member has asked who are the militia, if they are
not the people of this country," and that "[t]hey consist now of the whole peo-
ple." Id. In addition, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution proposed
that the militia referred to in the Second Amendment is "the entire populace
capable of bearing arms, and not . . . any formal group such as what is today
called the National Guard." REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 7.
To support this position, the Subcommittee cited the Militia Act of 1792. Id.
(citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33 (enacted by 2d Cong., 1st Sess.)). The Militia
Act mandated that militia members own arms and keep ammunition. Id. The
Act defined militia to include almost every adult male in the United States. Id.
Moreover, James Madison, who supported federal regulation of the militia,
recognized that the people made up the militia. Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 76, at 378. Madison stated that "[i]f insurrections should
arise, or invasions should take place, the people ought unquestionably be em-
ployed to suppress and repel them, rather than a standing army." Id. (emphasis
added). In addition, the Federal Farmer, a prominent anti-federalist, also recog-
nized the militia as consisting of the entire body of the people. See Letter from the
Federal Farmer to the Republican No. III (Oct. 10, 1787) [hereinafter Federal Farmer
III], in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 21 (William H.
Bennett ed., 1978) [hereinafter LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER]. For a fur-
ther discussion of the Federal Farmer's views, see infra notes 170-79 and accom-
panying text.
101. For a discussion of the eighteenth century meaning of the word mili-
tia, see Kates, supra note 8, at 213-17. Mr. Kates wrote: "The Founders stated
what they meant by 'militia' on various occasions. Invariably they defined it in
some phrase like 'the whole body of the people,' while their references to the
organized-military-unit usage of militia, which they call a 'select militia,' were
strongly pejorative." Id. at 216. For further discussion of the eighteenth cen-
tury meaning of the word militia, see REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note
46, at 4-7; Levinson, supra note 8, at 646-47.
102. See Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 425.
103. See id., in 3 ELLIOTr'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 659.
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proposed amendment provided:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-
regulated militia, composed of the body of the peope trained to arms, is
the proper, natural, and safe defence [sic] of a free state; that
standing armies, in times of peace, are dangerous to liberty and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and
protection of the community will admit; and that, in all cases,
the military should be under strict subordination to, and gov-
erned by, the civil power.10 4
This amendment specifically refers to "the people" as the object of the
right to bear arms. 10 5
State's right proponents do not see this amendment as an obstacle
to their interpretation of the Second Amendment.' 0 6 They argue that
the word "people" used in colonial constitutions often referred to the
states as opposed to individuals, and therefore, a similar definition ap-
plies within the Second Amendment. 10 7 At least one constitutional
scholar has criticized this view.10 8 Professor Stanford Levinson main-
tains that this view is inconsistent with the First, Fourth, Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, all of which use the term "the people" when refer-
ring to individual rights.' 0 9
The view that the term "the people" refers to sovereign rights is
also incompatible with the Supreme Court's recent ruling in United States
104. Id. (emphasis added). Stephen Halbrook argues that this provision
clearly provides for an individual right to bear arms. See Halbrook, supra note
40, at 27. He points out that the three clauses of the provision are stated inde-
pendently of one another. Id. He contends that the first clause is "a general
protection of the individual right to have arms for any and all lawful purposes,"
and it is in no way dependent on the clause regarding the militia. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and
Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 42 (1984) ("The Second
Amendment, concerning the right of the people to keep and bear arms, was
formed in contemplation, not of individual rights, but of the maintenance of the
states' active organized militias.").
107. Id.
108. See Levinson, supra note 8, at 652-54.
109. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.")
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend IV ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... ") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend IX
("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.") (emphasis added); U.S.
CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.") (emphasis added).
14271992] COMMENT
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v. Verdugo-Urquidez.t"0 The Verdugo-Urquidez Court held that "the peo-
ple" referred to in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, and "to
whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country
to be considered part of that community."' I ISignificantly, the Court
found that the people protected by the Second Amendment are the
same people protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. 1 2 Each of these amendments refer to individual rights. 1s
Furthermore, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court emphasized that the terms
"the people" and "persons" mean two different things in the Constitu-
tion. 114 The Court indicated that the term "person" is used when
describing rights guaranteed to all individuals physically located in the
United States, while the term "the people" is used when describing
rights guaranteed only to those individuals legally residing in the United
States." 5 The Court held that individuals must have sufficient ties to
the national community to benefit from the rights guaranteed to "the
people." 16
2. The Debates of the Remaining States
The remaining state ratification debates regarding Congress' power
to regulate the militia and the right to keep and bear arms were not as
well recorded as the Virginia debates. 1 7 Nonetheless, the known rec-
ommendations of these states further weaken the state's right argument.
Every state recommending a right to keep and bear arms provision sug-
gested that the Constitution give "the people" that right. 1 8 Further-
110. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, reh ' denied, 494
U.S. 1092 (1990).
111. Id. at 265.
112. Id. This Supreme Court ruling is extremely problematic for those
state's right advocates who claim that the term "the people" does not mean the
same thing in the Second Amendment as it does in the other amendments dis-
cussed by the Verdugo Court. See, e.g., Maynard Holbrook Jackson, Jr., Handgun
Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 189, 192 (1977).
Jackson contends that the term "the people" as used in the Second Amendment
applies only to the people who are part of the state militia, and presumably he is
referring to the organized state militia. Id.
113. For the text of these amendments, see supra note 109.
114. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 265. As previously indicated, Professor Cress ar-
gues that the term "person" is used in the Constitution to refer to individual
rights and the term "the people" is used to refer to state's rights. Cress, supra
note 106, at 31.
115. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 265.
116. Id. For further discussion of the meaning of the term "the people" in
the Constitution, see Kates, supra note 8, at 218.
117. See generally 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76 (recording all state rati-
fication debates).
118. 4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 968. North Carolina recommended an
amendment with the same wording as the one recommended by Virginia. Id. In
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more, the amendments recommended by New Hampshire and a
minority of the Pennsylvania delegates firmly establish that the Framers
did not intend the right to keep and bear arms simply to protect military
usage of arms. 1 9 New Hampshire recommended that the Constitution
be amended to expressly provide that "Congress shall never disarm any
citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion."120 Use of
the word "citizen" in the New Hampshire amendment connotes an indi-
vidual right. 12'
The Pennsylvania minority delegates' amendment irrefutably ex-
tended the right to keep and bear arms to individuals.' 2 2 The amend-
ment provided that the purpose of this right was:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence [sic]
of themselves and their own State .... or for the purpose of killing
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or
any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of
public injury from individuals .... 123
addition, New York and Rhode Island suggested amendments that read "the peo-
ple have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, including the
body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural and safe de-
fence [sic] of a free state." 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 328, 335 (em-
phasis added).
119. See 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 326 (listing New Hampshire
amendment); 3 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 65 (discussing Pennsylvania
amendment).
120. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 326 (emphasis added).
121. Id. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the New Hampshire amendment's
right to keep and bear arms provision is limited to "militia purposes." Id. An
amendment providing for freedom of religion and conscience separated the
right to keep arms provision from an amendment concerning standing armies.
Id. at 326; see also Halbrook, supra note 40, at 27. Halbrook stated that "[t]he
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania proposals for the right to keep and bear arms
were viewed as among 'those amendments which particularly concern several
personal rights and liberties.' " Id. (citing A Foreign Spectator, Remarks on the
Amendments, No. XI, FEDERAL GAZETrE, Nov. 28, 1788).
122. See 3 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 65. Although only a minority of the
Pennsylvania delegates adopted the amendment, the views of this minority
greatly influenced the adoption of the Bill of Rights. See A Pennsylvanian III, PA.
GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1788 [hereinafter Pennsylvanian III], reprinted in 2 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1774 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., microform supp. 1984) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
Toench Coxe, an influential senator and a federalist, opined that the views of the
Pennsylvania minority represented "the ground of opposition to the Constitu-
tion throughout the union." Id.
123. 3 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 658. State's right advocates contend
that although the recommendations of the Pennsylvania minority had an impact
on the ratification conventions of the other states, "the salient feature" of these
recommended amendments was that they guaranteed the states the right to arm
their militia should Congress fail to do so. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at
58. Feller and Gotting, however, completely ignore the provision that grants
individuals the right to keep and bear arms. Id.
Furthermore, Professor Rohner, also a state's right advocate, states that
although the colonists were concerned with personal protection and provision of
1992] COMMENT 1429
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Thus, this amendment would have provided the people with an individ-
ual right to bear arms for a variety of purposes. 12 4
The debates of the state ratification conventions do not conclusively
establish the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights with respect to
the right to keep and bear arms. The debates, however, did inform the
First Congress' consideration of the Second Amendment. 125
C. Adoption of the Second Amendment by the First Congress
In all, the states suggested to the First Congress 210 amendments
containing 100 different substantive provisions. 12 6 James Madison rec-
ommended fourteen of these, including a provision guaranteeing the
right to keep and bear arms, for adoption by the House of Representa-
tives. 127 The recorded debates of the First Congress do not reveal the
explicit reason for including the right to keep and bear arms in the Bill
of Rights. 12 8 James Madison, however, did discuss the general reasons
food, "there is no persuasive indication that these considerations influenced
Congress or the various state ratifying conventions in adopting the second
amendment." Rohner, supra note 8, at 57. Professor Rohner fails to reconcile
this proposition with Toench Coxe's contention that the views of the Penn-
sylvania minority represented the basis throughout the union for opposing the
Constitution. Pennsylvanian III, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
122, at 1774.
124. PA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 266.
Interestingly, however, the Pennsylvania minority did not suggest an unlimited
right to bear arms. Id. The government could enact laws prohibiting criminals
from carrying firearms. Id. The amendment also permitted regulation of arms
as was necessary for the public safety. Id. These are the exact objectives of the
Brady Bill. Biskupic, supra note 2, at 604. Hence, while the Pennsylvania
amendment presents strong evidence against the state's right view, the amend-
ment supports the goal most state's right advocates seek to achieve-effective
gun control.
125. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE, supra note 46, at 6; Penn-
sylvanian III, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122, at 1774 (citing
representative view of Pennsylvania minority). In its report, the Senate Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution stated:
When the first Congress convened for the purpose of drafting a Bill of
Rights, it delegated the task to James Madison. Madison did not write
upon a blank tablet. Instead he obtained a pamphlet listing the State
proposals for a Bill of Rights and sought to produce a briefer version
incorporating all the vital proposals of these. His purpose was to incor-
porate, not distinguish by technical changes, proposals such as that of
the Pennsylvania minority, Sam Adams and the New Hampshire
delegates.
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMIVrEE, supra note 46, at 6.
126. 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 983.
127. Id. The right to keep and bear arms provision initially read: "The
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military ser-
vice in person." Id. at 1026.
128. Id. at 1026-27. The debates regarding Madison's suggested amend-
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underlying the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 12 9
Madison, who was an adamant supporter of the Constitution and
the formation of a federal government, felt that those who opposed the
Constitution feared that the federal government would use its constitu-
tional powers to strip the people of their individual liberties.' 3 0
Madison believed that the Framers could address these concerns by in-
cluding in the Constitution certain basic safeguards of the rights of the
people. 13 1 Madison opined that, if Congress could provide these safe-
guards without damaging the Constitution, Congress should adopt
them. 132
The Framers may have considered the right to keep and bear arms
the most essential of all of these safeguards. The Framers sought to
balance the fear of despotism and abuse of a government-controlled
military with the belief that a well regulated militia was necessary for the
defense of a free state.13 3 The Framers decided that Congress needed
ment providing for the right to bear arms centered primarily on the clause ex-
empting religiously scrupulous people from military service. Id.
129. Id. at 1024-25.
130. Id. at 1024. Madison stated:
I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed [the Constitu-
tion] disliked it because it did not contain effectual provisions against
encroachment on particular rights, and those safeguards which they
have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and the
magistrate who exercises the sovereign power; nor ought we to con-
sider them safe, while a great number of our fellow-citizens think these
securities necessary.
Id. at 1025.
131. Id. at 1024-25. Madison argued: "It will be a desirable thing to extin-
guish from the bosom of every member of the community, any apprehensions
that there are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the
liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled." Id. at 1024.
Madison's statements show that he believed the people had grown accustomed
to certain fundamental rights, and feared that those rights were in jeopardy at
the hands of the new government. Id. at 1024-25. As a result, Madison believed
that the people wanted these rights expressed in the Constitution. Id. Madison
contended that "[the drafters] ought not to disregard [the people's] inclination,
but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes and ex-
pressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under [the] constitution."
Id.
132. Id. at 1024-25. Madison stated:
I do conceive that the constitution may be amended; that is to say, if all
power is subject to abuse, that then it is possible the abuse of the pow-
ers of the General Government may be guarded against in a more se-
cure manner than is now done, while no one advantage arising from the
exercise of that power shall be damaged or endangered by it. We have
in this way something to gain, and if we proceed with caution, nothing
to lose.
Id. at 1025.
133. See id. The colonial charters and state constitutions, as well as the
Constitutional Convention, Virginia debates and the amendments recom-
mended by the various states, clearly demonstrate that the Framers feared fed-
eral control of the militia. For a discussion of these charters, constitutions,
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to have the power to regulate the militia, and that the people had to be
given a safeguard against potential abuse of this power.' 3 4 Accordingly,
the Framers may have included the first phrase of the Second Amend-
ment, "[a] well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free
State," to show why the second phrase, "the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" was necessary. 135
The state's right view is inconsistent with the theory that the Second
Amendment was adopted to safeguard against the government's abuse
of its power to regulate the military.' 3 6 State's right advocates contend
that the right to bear arms extends only to the arming of organized mili-
tary forces.' 37 As indicated above, however, the Framers intended the
Second Amendment to protect the people from just these types of
forces.
State's right proponents also contend that the right to keep and
bear arms was included in the Second Amendment in order to provide
debates and amendments, see supra notes 62-125 and accompanying text. An
analysis of The Federalist Papers and the writings of the Anti-Federalists also illus-
trates that the Framers felt that the easiest way for the federal government to
suppress the people would be to control an organized military. For a discussion
of the debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, see infra notes
143-202 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at 380
(discussing George Mason's position on why people should have right to keep
and bear arms).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. II. This was not the final wording of the Second
Amendment that the House of Representatives adopted. See 5 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 30, at 1107, 1127. The House adopted an amendment which read: "A well
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;
but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Id. at
1107. The changes in the language were made by the Senate; however, most of
the Senate debates were not recorded. Id. at 1145. Yet, Mr. Schwartz reports
that other than removing the language regarding conscientious objectors, the
Senate merely performed the function of "tightening up the language" and
"striking out surplus wording and provisions." Id.
136. The First Congress could probably have provided for defense against
a standing federal army by giving the states the power to arm local militia units
under each state's control. The debates between the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists, however, demonstrate that the Framers feared all organized military
units, not just those under the control of the federal government. See, e.g., Fed-
eral Farmer IH, in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 21 (dis-
cussing Federal Farmer's view on dangers presented by all forms of organized
military units). For further discussion of these debates, see infra notes 152-202
and accompanying text. In addition, the fear of organized military units under
the control of the states is also evidenced by the fact that three state constitutions
forbade state governmental control of the military. See MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art.
XVII., reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 337; PA. CONST. OF 1776, re-
printed in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 266; VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 16.
137. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at 64; Rohner, supra note 8, at 53-
[Vol. 37: p. 14071432
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for the common defense. 138 The limited recorded debates of the
United States Senate, however, indicate that Congress was not con-
cerned with losing an adequate defense if the militia was disarmed. 139
Indeed, the first Senate rejected a proposal that it insert the words "for
the common defense" after the phrase "right of the people to keep and
bear arms."' 140 The Framers were confident that the federal govern-
ment would provide for the common defense, whether it be through
regulation of the militia or by establishment of a standing army.'
However, because the Framers were unsure exactly how this defense
would be insured, they provided the people with the right to keep and
bear arms as a check against abuses of Congress' power over the
military. 142
138. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at 64; Rohner, supra note 8, at 53-
55.
139. HARDY, supra note 47, at 76. Rather, the people were concerned that
Congress would purposely fail to arm the militia in order to have a reason to
establish a standing army, which would then provide for the national defense.
See Virginia Debates, in 3 ELLIoTT's DEBATES, supra note 76, at 379-80 (discussing
view of George Mason and Patrick Henry that Congress might fail to arm militia
so that Congress would have reason to establish standing army).
140. See HARDY, supra note 47, at 76 (discussing Senate's debates on Second
Amendment). State's right advocates have argued that the Senate removed the
phrase "for the common defense" because it was redundant. Jackson, supra note
112, at 193. Specifically, Mr. Jackson contends that the phrase "a well regulated
militia being necessary for the security of a free state" already limited the pur-
pose of the Second Amendment to providing for the common defense. Id. The
rationale underlying the Bill of Rights, however, indicates that Congress did not
include the first phrase of the Second Amendment to provide for the common
defense. This phrase was probably intended to show that the reason the people
needed the right to keep and bear arms was to defend against potential abuse of
the militia by the federal government. Moreover, Article 1, Section 8, Clauses
15 and 16 of the Constitution already gave Congress the power to regulate and
call forth the militia to provide for the common defense. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cls. 15, 16. Thus, it was not necessary to grant this same power in the Second
Amendment.
141. See HARDY, supra note 47, at 76 (discussing Senate debates on Second
Amendment).
142. This is not to say that protection against military encroachment on the
liberties of the people was the only reason for adopting the Second Amendment.
The common law development of the right to bear arms and the amendments
recommended by the various states suggest that the right extended to self-de-
fense, hunting, enforcement of the local laws and other purposes. For a discus-
sion of the development of the right to keep and bear arms, see supra notes 45-
72 and accompanying text. In addition, Madison's placement of the right to
bear arms in the original draft of the Bill of Rights suggests that it was not
merely a response to Article I, Section 8, Clause 16. HARDY, supra note 46, at 72.
Originally, Madison would have inserted the Bill of Rights to amend specific
provisions of the Constitution rather than appending the Bill of Rights as a list
at the end of the document. Id. Madison, however, did not intend to use the
right to keep and bear arms to amend Article I, Section 8, Clause 16. Id. In-
stead, he would have placed the right to keep and bear arms in Article I, Section
9, along with freedom of speech and religion, rights which are indisputably indi-
vidual by nature, and which have been recognized as the most fundamental of all
27
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V. VIEWS OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURES WHO INFLUENCED THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was followed by a heated
debate between many of the major political figures of the late eighteenth
century. 143 On one side of the debate were the Federalists, who
strongly supported adoption of the Constitution as it was drafted in
Philadelphia during the summer of 1787.144 On the other side of the
debate were the Anti-Federalists, who felt that the Constitution did not
sufficiently protect the autonomy of the states and individual rights. 145
The most prominent record of the views of the Federalists are the essays
of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, which constitute
The Federalist Papers.146 The Letters From the Federal Farmer To the Republican
are one of the most commonly cited sources of the Anti-Federalist
views. 147
After the American Revolution, American citizens were skeptical of
rights. Id.; see also Konisberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (holding infringe-
ment on freedom of speech deserves strict scrutiny). By placing the right to bear
arms in Article I, Section 9, Madison intended it to be an individual right. Also,
Madison did not append the right to keep and bear arms language to the militia
clauses of the Constitution. Id. This indicates that Madison did not feel that
military encroachment on the liberty of the people was the only reason the right
was necessary. Id. For further discussion of Madison's original placement of the
right to keep and bear arms, see Kates, supra note 8, at 223.
143. See generally THE FEDERALIST (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); LETTERS
FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100.
144. See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 143.
145. See generally LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100.
146. See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 143.
147. The Federal Farmer's letters were written between October 1787 and
January 1788 as part of an effort to secure amendments to the Constitution. See
LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at xiii. For many years the
letters have been attributed to Richard Henry Lee. Id. at xiv. Lee was a repre-
sentative of Virginia at the Constitutional Convention, a Senator in the First
Congress, and a strong supporter of a bill of individual rights. Id. However, in
recent times, some commentators have questioned this attribution. See generally
Gordon S. Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 31 WM. &
MARY Q 299 (1974) (discussing identity of author of Letters from Federal
Farmer); see also LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at xiv.
Regardless of the actual authorship of the letters, commentators agree that
the letters express many of the same views as Lee and are recognized as a formi-
dable counterpart to The Federalist. Id. at xv, xxxiii-xxxv. Alexander Hamilton
himself referred to the Federal Farmer as a formidable opponent. Id. at xxxv.
Furthermore, the letters were widely advertised during the ratification conven-
tions and "had a substantial impact on the ratification debates and actually sup-
plied many of the arguments put forth by other opponents of the Constitution."
Id. at xxxv (citing JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS (1961)). In-
deed, the letters "became a sort of textbook for opposition to the Constitution
as The Federalist became for the supporters of the document." Id. at xxxvi (citing
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS (Morton Borden ed., 1965)). For a further discus-
sion of the debate over authorship of the letters, see id. at xiv-xx.
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placing their new-found liberty in the hands of a central government. 148
They feared that the new federal government would absorb all the pow-
ers of government, usurping the states' role as a protector of individual
rights. 149 Before the states would accept the new Constitution, the Fed-
eralists had to convince the people that their liberty was not in dan-
ger.' 50 The Federalists focused on the fact that the central government
could not tyrannize an armed populace. 15 1
A. The People Have the Right to Bear Arms
In The Federalist Number 46, James Madison addressed concern over
the division of power between the federal government and the states. 152
Madison contended that the federal government would not threaten the
existence of the states because both governments are subject to com-
mon constituents.1 53 Madison opined that the people were the supreme
148. Pennsylvanian III, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122,
at 1774.
149. Toench Coxe, a Federalist from Pennsylvania, wrote in the Penn-
sylvania Gazette on February 20, 1788 that the Pennsylvania minority dissented
because they felt the powers vested in Congress would "absorb and annihilate"
the powers of the several states. Id.
During the debate over the adoption of the Constitution, Coxe wrote under
two pen names, "A Pennsylvanian" and "A Freeman." 15 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note 122, at 453-54. For a discussion of the position of the Penn-
sylvania minority, see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
150. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 294-300 (James
Madison).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Madison stated that:
[The people] must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the de-
rivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not
depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different
governments whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge
its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other.
Id.
Alexander Hamilton also contended that the representative system would
provide the people with a check on the powers of the federal government. THE
FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 143, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton,
addressing the concerns of those who feared the establishment of standing ar-
mies, stated:
[I]t is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision
against military establishments in time of peace to say that the whole
power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the repre-
sentatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after all, the only
efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people which is
attainable in a civil society.
Id.
In addition to Madison and Hamilton, Toench Coxe, writing as "A Free-
man" in February 1788, also proposed that the people provide a check on the
federal government because the federal representatives are accountable to the
people. See A Freeman III, PA. GAZETrE, Feb. 6, 1788 [hereinafter Freeman III],
reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
29
Wagner: Gun Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: T
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
authority over both.' 54 Madison further reasoned that any fear of the
federal government usurping the power of the states was unreasonable
because the people would have closer ties to the state governments than
to the federal government.155 Madison argued that the only conceivable
way the federal government would be able to suppress the people would
be by accumulating a military force. 156
Madison also proposed, however, that even if the federal govern-
ment formed a standing army "fully equal to the resources of the coun-
try ... [and] entirely at the devotion of the federal government... the
State governments with the people on their side would be able to repel the
danger."' 15 7 The federal army would only be made up of a portion of
the citizenry able to bear arms. 158 This army would be up against "a
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their com-
mon liberties and united and conducted by [state] governments possess-
ing their affections and confidence."' 159 Madison believed that the
people could repel a federal army by taking up arms.160 Because there
was no right to keep and bear arms in the Constitution as originally
TUTION 50-51 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION].
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 294 (James Madison).
155. Id. at 295. Madison went on to argue that the only way the federal
government could win the favor of the people would be to earn it through effec-
tive administration. Id. He proposed that if the federal government won the
people's favor in that way, the government deserved such favor. Id. Further-
more, Madison argued that the members of the federal government would be
naturally biased toward the states, as the members themselves would be repre-
sentatives from the various states. Id. at 296-97. According to Madison, if the
federal government attempted to encroach upon the powers of the states, the
states would easily defeat the encroachment. Id. at 297. He stated that "should
an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular
States . . . the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand." Id. He
argued that the federal government, composed of "[a] few representatives of the
people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of repre-
sentatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the
whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter." Id. at 298 (empha-
sis added).
156. Id. at 298.
157. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
158. Id. According to Madison's estimates, such an army could not exceed
one hundredth-part of the total number of citizens or one twenty-fifth of those
capable of bearing arms. Id. Madison predicted that this group could not ex-
ceed twenty five or thirty thousand men. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added). Alexander Hamilton agreed that the people
would be able to repel federal abuse of power. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra
note 143, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton stated that "[i]f the repre-
sentatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left
but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all
positive forms of government." Id.
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James Madison).
1436 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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drafted, Madison must have assumed an inherent right to do so.161
Madison's argument is not necessarily based on an assumption that
the people have an inherent right to keep private arms. Madison could
have been assuming that the states have a right to arm their organized
militia. The theme of The Federalist Number 46, the continuation of state
sovereignty, supports this theory. 162 Furthermore, Alexander Hamil-
ton's argument in The Federalist Number 29, that a "select [state] militia"
would best serve the interests of both the federal government and the
people, also supports the view that the Framers assumed the states had a
right to arm their organized militia. 16 3 In addition to providing for the
national defense, Hamilton opined that such a force would protect the
liberties of the people, should Congress form a standing army.164
While Hamilton's views enhance the argument that the right to
keep and bear arms guarantees the states the right to arm organized
military forces, there is also evidence in The Federalist Papers indicating
that "select militia" were not the object of the right to keep and bear
arms. 165 Madison's terminology in The Federalist Number 46 suggests that
he was not referring to Hamilton's "select militia," but rather, to the
body of the people as a whole. 16 6 Madison stated that a standing army
would be up against "near half a million of citizens with arms in their
hands."' 16 7 It is unlikely that Madison used the word "citizens" to-refer
161. Later, at the First Congress, Madison supported amendments to the
Constitution guaranteeing individual rights. 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at
1025. However, Madison's support was conditional upon the amendments not
threatening the powers of the federal government. Id.
162. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 294-300 (James
Madison). For a discussion of the central themes of THE FEDERALIST No. 46, see
supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, supra note 143, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton felt that it would be impossible to
properly regulate the entire population. Id. Therefore, the new government
needed a select militia for the national defense. Id. Hamilton stated:
To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other classes of
the citizens to be under arms for the purpose of going through military
exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the
degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a
well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people and a
serious public inconvenience and loss.
Id. at 184.
164. Id. at 185. Hamilton contended that
[a select corps] will not only lessen the call for military establishments,
but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form
an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the
liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little if at
all inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready
to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens.
Id.
165. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James Madison).
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
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to the select state-run militia Hamilton favored. 16 8
In addition, The Federalist Papers were intended to placate the fears of
those who opposed the Constitution-a body that feared select groups
of militia as much as they feared standing armies. 169 For example, in his
Third Letter to the Republican, the Federal Farmer made it clear that
those opposing the Constitution were concerned about federal control
of the military.170 The Federal Farmer expressed two specific con-
cerns.' 7 1 First, he feared the development of a standing federal
army. 17 2 Second, he feared that Congress would use its power over
taxes and the militia to amass a select force. 173 Consequently, the Fed-
eral Farmer contended that it was essential that the yeomanry of the
country have a proper check on the powers of Congress to collect taxes
and raise armies.' 7 4 The Federal Farmer outlined constitutional
168. Id. In addition to these statements in The Federalist No. 46, one com-
mentator argued that The Federalist No. 10 and The Federalist No. 14 show that
Madison believed that the states would not properly safeguard the people's lib-
erty. Levinson, supra note 8, at 651-52. Professor Levinson cited to Madison's
proposition that the states would not likely preserve liberty because the states
could "easily fall under the sway of a local dominant faction." Id. at 652. Con-
sidering this proposition, it is unlikely that Madison was arguing that the right to
keep and bear arms, which protected the liberty of the people, rested with the
states.
169. See, e.g., Federal Farmer III, in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER,
supra note 100, at 13-24 (reflecting Federal Farmer's fear of select militias). For
a discussion of the Anti-Federalists' views on select militias, see infra notes 171-
79.
170. See Federal Farmer III, in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra
note 100, at 13-24. The Federal Farmer wrote that the powers vested in the
federal government by the Constitution, as it was originally proposed, including
the power to lay and collect taxes, form the militia, make bankruptcy laws and
raise armies and navies "comprehend all the essential powers in the community,
and those which will be left to the states will be of no great importance." Id. at
18-19.
171. Id. at 19-21.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Federal Farmer noted that, although the proposed Constitu-
tion limited Congress' power to appropriate funds for the maintenance of a
standing army to two years, Congress' power to raise such an army was unlim-
ited. Id. Once Congress formed a standing army, the Federal Farmer felt that
the army would have no trouble convincing the Congress to appropriate monies
every two years to support it. Id. He stated that "it is very evident to me, that we
shall have a large standing army as soon as the monies to support them can be
possibly found." Id. The Federal Farmer's concerns regarding Congress' use of
its power to regulate the militia to accumulate a select force were not un-
founded. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 153, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton argued that if the militia were to provide for defense of the country, a
select corps would have to be formed, as it would be impossible to properly
regulate the entire body of the people. Id.
174. Federal Farmer III, in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note
100, at 21. In this regard, the Federal Farmer acknowledged the Federalist argu-
ment that an armed populace could defend itself. Id. He proposed:
It is true, the yeomanry ... possess the lands, the weight of property,
possess arms, and are too strong a body of men to be openly offended-
1438
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amendments necessary to avoid federal abuse of the military power in
his Eighteenth Letter to the Republican. 17 5 He proposed that Congress
amend the Constitution to ensure that all men capable of bearing arms
be given the right to do so and that the Constitution prohibit the estab-
lishment of any form of select militia or "distinct bodies of military
men." 
17 6
These two letters from the Federal Farmer show that opponents to
the Constitution feared Congress' ability to place the citizens under
martial law, whether it was by means of a standing army or by means of a
select militia.' 77 The opponents felt that the only way to defend the
and, therefore, it is urged, they will take care of themselves, that men
who shall govern will not dare pay any disrespect to their opinions.
Id. (emphasis added). However, the Federal Farmer did not believe that the
people's ability to possess arms was enough to negate Congress' power to build
armies and lay taxes. He stated:
It is easily perceived, that if [the people] have not their proper negative
• . . on the passage of laws relative to taxes and armies, they may in
twenty or thirty years be by means imperceptible to them, totally de-
prived of that boasted weight and strength: This may be done in a great
measure by [C]ongress, if disposed to do it, by modelling the militia.
Should one fifth or one eighth part of the men capable of bearing arms
be made a select militia, as has been proposed, and those the young and
ardent part of the community, possessed of but little or no property,
and all the others put upon a plan that will render them of no impor-
tance, the former will answer all the purposes of an army, while the latter will
be defenceless [sic].
Id., in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 21-22 (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the Federal Farmer argued that the mere power to elect
representatives to the federal legislature was not enough to provide a check on
Congress. Id. He believed that it would be nearly impossible for thirty or forty
thousand people to find one man who possessed similar views to themselves. Id.
175. Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788)[hereinafter Federal Farmer XVIII], in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra
note 100, at 122-32.
176. Id., in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 124.
The Federal Farmer argued that a militia,
not much unlike regular troops, will ever produce an inattention to the
general militia; and the consequences has ever been, and always must
be, that the substantial men, having families and property, will gener-
ally be without arms, without knowing the use of them, and defenceless
[sic]; whereas, to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people
always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to
use them.
Id.
177. See, e.g., Federal Farmer III, in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra
note 100, at 20-22 (discussing Federal Farmer's views on government's power to
model militia); Federal Farmer XVIII, supra note 175, in LETTERS FROM THE FED-
ERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 124 (outlining Federal Farmer's proposed con-
stitutional amendments). The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution cited
the Federal Farmer's letters in support of its conclusion that
[t]he suspicion of select militia units expressed in these passages is a
clear indication that the framers of the Constitution did not seek to
guarantee a State right to maintain formed groups similar to the Na-
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people's liberty was to arm the entire population. 17 8 Furthermore, the
only way to guarantee the right to keep and bear arms was to make it an
express right in the Constitution. ' 79
Because the Bill of Rights was adopted to appease the concerns of
doubters such as the Federal Farmer, it is unlikely that the First Con-
gress would adopt provisions for arming the very type of military force
that these doubters feared the most. 180 Thus, state's right advocates are
left with the argument that even if the right to keep and bear arms ap-
plies to the people as a whole, a state has the prerogative to exercise this
right on the people's behalf. This argument, while finding little support
in the writings of either the Federalists or the Anti-Federalists, is consis-
tent with the arguments of some state's right proponents.' 8 ' These
tional Guard, but rather to protect the right of individual citizens to
keep and bear arms.
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMIrrEE, supra note 46, at 5. The Subcommittee also
quoted an unnamed delegate at the Pennsylvania Convention as stating, "Con-
gress may give us a select militia which will, in fact, be a standing army-or
Congress, afraid of a general militia, may say there will be no militia at all.
When a select militia is formed, the people in general may be disarmed." Id. at
4.
In addition, in his journal of the debates at the Constitutional Convention,
James Madison noted that the delegates expressed similar sentiments at the
Convention. MADISON, supra note 73, at 557. Madison wrote that Oliver Ells-
worth, a representative of Connecticut, "considered the idea of a select militia as
impracticable; and if it were not, it would be followed by ruinous declension of
the great body of the militia." Id.
178. Federal Farmer XVIII, supra note 175, in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER, supra note 100, at 122-24. For a discussion of the Federal Farmer's sug-
gested amendments, see supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
179. Federal Farmer XVIII, supra note 175, in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER, supra note 100, at 122-24.
180. See 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 1024-25. At the debates of the First
Congress, Madison opined that the Representatives should amend the Constitu-
tion to include rights that opponents of the Constitution felt were in danger. Id.
One individual rights commentator, Steven Halbrook, has contended that
"[s]ince these same prominent anti-federalists were among the most vocal in
calling for a guarantee recognizing the individual right to have arms, it is incon-
ceivable that they would not have objected to what became the [S]econd
[A]mendment had anyone understood it not to protect personal rights." Hal-
brook, supra note 40, at 36-37. In addition, the Senate Subcommittee on the
Constitution stated: "Lee, in particular, [who] sat in the Senate which approved
the Bill of Rights . . .would hardly have meant the [S]econd [A]mendment to
apply only to the select militias he so feared and disliked." REPORT OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 5. The Subcommittee assumed that Richard Henry
Lee authored the letters of the Federal Farmer. See id.
Notwithstanding the evidence that the Framers feared select militias as
much as standing armies, state's right advocates have cited Hamilton's argu-
ments, in The Federalist No. 29, as definitive proof that the militia the Second
Amendment refers to is select militia. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 12, at 64
(discussing Hamilton's arguments on formation of select militia). For a discus-
sion of Hamilton's view that select militia would provide the best defense of the
nation, see supra note 163 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 8, at 212; THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note
1440 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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state's rights proponents contend that while the right to keep and bear
arms was intended to protect against tyranny, it is nonetheless a state's
right to arm the militia. 18 2
B. The People Have the Right to Supply Their Own Arms
In The Federalist Number 46, Madison never referred to the states as
the source of the arms held by "near half a million of citizens. '"183 In fact,
Madison referred to the people as the source of arms and to the states
only as the means by which the armed population would organize to
defend themselves.' 8 4 In comparing America with the European king-
doms, Madison stated:
Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess
over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of
subordinate [state] governments, to which the people are at-
tached and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a
barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmounta-
ble than any which a simple government of any form can admit
of. ' 8 5
In this passage, Madison specifically noted that the states' function with
regard to the militia was the appointment of officers. 18 6 He did not say
143, at 299 (James Madison) (discussing Madison's view of state's role with re-
spect to militia). For a discussion of who would supply the people with arms, see
infra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
182. Kates, supra note 8, at 212.
183. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James Madison) (em-
phasis added).
184. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis added). Madison distinguished the American federal
government from the kingdoms of Europe by noting that the American govern-
ment trusted its people with arms, while the European governments did not. Id.
He reasoned that as long as the people were armed, they could defend them-
selves against any military force organized by the government. Id. at 299-300.
Furthermore, Madison proposed that if oppressed people of Europe had the
same rights to bear arms as Americans, the Europeans could have freed them-
selves from despotism. Id. In addition, Madison contended that the possession
of arms coupled with the organizational benefits of state governments would
ensure "that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily over-
turned in spite of the legions which surround it." Id. at 300.
In addition, Noah Webster, a Federalist from Pennsylvania, also recognized
an inherent right to keep and bear arms in the American people. See REPORT OF
THE SUBCOMMiTTEE, supra note 46, at 5. Like Madison, Webster felt that the
right to bear arms distinguished Americans from the oppressed citizens of Eu-
rope. Id. Webster stated:
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they
are in almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in
America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword, because the whole body
of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of
regular troops that can be, on any pretense, raised in the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
186. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James Madison).
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that the states would arm the militia. 18 7 Madison identified two reasons
why the people would be able to repel a standing federal army.' 8 8 First,
the people were armed, and second, they were organized by the
states.1
89
187. Id. Maynard Holbrook Jackson, a state's right commentator, argues
that these passages illustrate Madison's view that the states would protect the
people from "a too powerful federal government." Jackson, supra note 112, at
194. When examining Madison's language regarding the impact of local govern-
ments on the overthrow of European tyrannies, Jackson concludes that Madison
was referring to the local governments as the source of arms. Id. Jackson, how-
ever, ignores the fact that Madison twice stated that "[b]esides the advantage of
being armed," local governments act as an additional barrier "against the enter-
prises of ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James
Madison). Also, in his discussion of the continuation of state sovereignty,
Madison never referred to the local governments as the source of the peoples'
arms.
Moreover, Toench Coxe, writing as "A Freeman," provided further evi-
dence that the right to keep and bear arms was not intended to be a right of the
states. See A Freeman II, PA. GAZErrE [hereinafter Freeman II], Jan. 30, 1788, re-
printed in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 153, at 508-
11. In Freeman II, Coxe listed fourteen categories of state powers. Id. Within
these categories, he listed the specific powers of the states. Id. However, no-
where did he list the power to arm the militia or the people. Id. Among the
states' powers with regard to the militia, Coxe listed the appointment of officers
and training of the militia, but not arming it. Id.
188. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James Madison).
189. Id. This should not be confused with the state's right argument that
the Second Amendment guarantees states the right to arm organized military
forces. See, e.g., Rohner, supra note 8, at 65 (stating that Second Amendment
only applies to organized military forces). Madison's writings suggest that the
states' role in protecting the people from tyranny was to organize a force that
was already armed. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 143, at 299 (James
Madison). For a discussion of Madison's view on the state's role of organizing
the militia, see supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
Even Alexander Hamilton, who favored using a select militia for both the
national defense and to protect the liberty of the people, believed that people
who were not members of the select militia had a right to keep and bear arms.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, supra note 143, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamilton)
(discussing Hamilton's view of select militia); THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note
143, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton) (examining Hamilton's view that there was
individual right to keep and bear arms). Hamilton argued that the organiza-
tional benefits provided by the states were essential to the defense of liberty. Id.
Hamilton explained that without such benefit, "[t]he citizens must rush tumultu-
ously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their
courage and despair." Id. Hamilton was presenting a scenario in which the
states controlled the militia instead of the federal government, and the states
abused their power. Id. In such a scenario, the people would be left without the
organizational benefits of the state. Id. If the federal government abused that
same power, however, the people could turn to the states for organization. Id. at
181. Hamilton assumed that even if the states controlled the militia and abused
their power, the people could still "rush tumultuously to arms." Id. at 180.
Thus, despite favoring a select militia, Hamilton believed that the people as a
whole had a right to arms that was independent of the states. Id. For a discus-
sion of Hamilton's views on select militia, see supra notes 163-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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The essays of Toench Coxe, a Federalist Senator from Penn-
sylvania, provide further support for the proposition that the Federalists
felt that the right to bear arms was inherent in the people.' 90 Coxe felt
that a main source of opposition to the proposed Constitution was Con-
gress' power over both the purse and the sword-taxes and the mili-
tia. 191 Coxe felt that the state legislatures had an adequate check over
the federal government's power of the purse because the states chose
the senators whose vote was necessary to take any commercial act.' 9 2
Coxe also stated that the power of the sword rested in the people and not
the federal government. 19 3 In addition, in A Pennsylvanian III Coxe
stated:
The power of the sword, say the minority of Pennsylvania, is in
the hands of Congress. My friends and countrymen, it is not
so, for THE POWERS OF THE SWORD ARE IN THE
HANDS OF THE YEOMANRY OF AMERICA FROM SIX-
TEEN TO SIXTY. The militia of these free Commonwealths,
entitled and accustomed to their arms, when compared with
any possible army, must be tremendous and irresistible. Who are
these militia? are they not ourselves.[sic] 94
Coxe also wrote, "I do not hesitate to affirm, that the unlimited power of
the sword is not in the hands of either thefoederal [sic] or state governments,
but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the people." 195
Importantly, Coxe asserted that the power of the sword rests in neither
the federal nor the state governments.' 9 6
In sum, the political correspondence relating to the adoption of the
190. See generally Pennsylvanian III, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 122 (examining Coxe's view that because people have individual right
to keep and bear arms, they could thwart select military force).
191. Id., reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122, at 1776-80.
In his Third Letter to the Republican, the Federal Farmer also voiced his objec-
tions to the powers vested in the federal government. Federal Farmer III, in LET-
TERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 18-22. The Federal Farmer
found the power to regulate the militia objectionable in itself, and particularly
objectionable when joined with the power to lay and collect taxes. Id., in LET-
TERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 20-21.
192. Pennsylvanian III, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122,
at 1776.
193. Id., reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122, at 1778-79.
194. Id.
195. Id., reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122, at 1780.
Coxe believed that because the Constitution did not take away the right to keep
and bear arms, the people necessarily retained that right. Id., reprinted in 2 Doc-
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122, at 1779. He stated: "Congress ha[s] no
power to disarm the militia. Their swords, and every other terrible implement
of the soldier, are the birth-right of an American. What clause in the state or federal
constitutions hath given away that important right." Id.
196. Id., reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 122, at 1779.
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Constitution supports an individual right to keep and bear arms. 197 The
Federalists based their argument in favor of ratification of the Constitu-
tion on three principles. First, the people would select their representa-
tives and, therefore, the federal government would be directly
accountable to the people.' 9 8 Second, the people would have the right
to keep and bear arms. 199 Third, the states would organize an armed
populace to repel any army the federal government might form. 20 0 The
letters of the Federal Farmer suggest that opponents to the original
draft of the Constitution did not disagree that, if these contentions were
true, the people would be able to check the power of the federal govern-
ment. 20 1 The letters of the Federal Farmer also suggest, however, the
feeling that Congress needed to express certain rights in the Constitu-
tion to ensure a realization of the principles on which the Federalists
based their argument. 20 2
VI. A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL GUN
CONTROL LEGISLATION
The common law history of the right to keep and bear arms, the
197. For a discussion of the political correspondence accompanying the
adoption of the Second Amendment by the First Congress, see supra notes 142-
96 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of the Federalist view on the representative system,
see supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of the Federalist view on the right to keep and bear
arms, see supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
200. For a discussion of the Federalist view on the role of the states with
regard to the militia, see supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of the letters of the Federal Farmer, see supra notes
170-79 and accompanying text. See also Levinson, supra note 8, at 649.
202. See Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. XVI (Jan. 20, 1788),
in LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 105. In his Sixteenth
Letter to the Republican, the Federal Farmer addressed the need for a bill of indi-
vidual rights to offset the powers of the federal government. Id. The Federal
Farmer countered the Federalists' argument that if specific rights were enumer-
ated, those not listed would be foregone. Id. He suggested adoption of a clause
stating that all rights not expressly given up by the people were reserved. Id. In
addition, he proposed that the Constitution be "express and explicit about [the
people's] essential rights, and not be forced to claim them on the precarious and
unascertained tenure of inferences and general principles, knowing that in any
controversy between [the people] and their rulers, concerning those rights, dis-
putes may be endless and nothing certain." Id., in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER, supra note 100, at 107.
Moreover, one individual right commentator has noted that those who de-
bated the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not dispute Toench Coxe's analysis
that the right to keep and bear arms was a private right. Halbrook, supra note
40, at 30. Halbrook stated: "The only dispute was over whether a bill of rights
was even necessary to protect such fundamental rights." Id. In addition, an-
other individual rights commentator has opined that "both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists accepted an individual right to arms." Kates, supra note 8, at 223.
Mr. Kates contends that the only debate was over how best to guarantee the
right to keep and bear arms. Id.
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legislative history of the Second Amendment and the debates between
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists show that the Framers of the Consti-
tution intended the right to keep and bear arms to be an individual
right. 20 3 Thus, a court should employ modern principals of constitu-
tional review, as established by the Supreme Court, to determine
whether the Second Amendment applies to federal gun control legisla-
tion. 20 4 The Supreme Court originally established the principles of ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny review in the early twentieth century. 20 5
Nonetheless, legislation restricting the right to keep and bear arms
has not been subject to review under these principles for three reasons.
First, some courts have dismissed challenges to state gun control legisla-
tion based on the view that the Second Amendment does not apply to
state legislation. 20 6 Second, in United States v. Miller, a 1939 challenge to
203. For a discussion of the history of the Second Amendment, see supra
notes 45-142 and accompanying text. The only substantial evidence supporting
the state's right view is found in the Virginia debates. For a discussion of the
Virginia debates, see supra notes 86-116 and accompanying text.
204. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 779 (2d ed.
1988).
205. Since the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court has established
two approaches to constitutional review of state and federal legislation. JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 351 (3d ed. 1986). First, when legislation
regulates all persons, and only involves matters of economic and social welfare,
the Court will defer to the legislature and uphold the legislation, as long as the
legislation is rationally related to some legitimate government interest. See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978) (holding
that economic regulations are accorded presumption of constitutionality);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) ("The
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for reg-
ulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not ... uncon-
stitutional unless ... it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that
it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators."). However, if the legislation relates to the exercise of a "fundamen-
tal right," the Court gives less deference to the legislature and independently
scrutinizes the legislation to determine whether it improperly restricts that fun-
damental right. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (holding
right to vote is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding
right to marry is basic civil right deserving of strict scrutiny); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (holding right to interstate travel occupies posi-
tion fundamental to concept of our federal union); see also NOWAK ET AL., supra, at
351 (discussing Supreme Court's review of government infringements on funda-
mental rights). If the law restricts a fundamental right, the Court will uphold the
law only if it is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding government
interest. See, e.g., American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 776-83 & n.14
(1974) (upholding requirement that new political parties or candidates demon-
strate public support to get on ballot because it furthered compelling state inter-
est in preventing elections from becoming unmanageable); see also NOWAK ET AL.,
supra, at 351.
206. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th
Cir. 1982) (upholding state legislation banning all handguns), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (upholding state ban of assault weapons), aff'd, 965 F.2d 723
(9th Cir. 1992). Some scholars point to the incorporation doctrine as evidence
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federal gun control legislation, the Supreme Court avoided constitu-
tional analysis of federal limitations on the possession of firearms. 20 7
The Court limited its discussion to the permissible scope of federal reg-
ulation of individual possession of firearms that are not within the ambit
of the Second Amendment. 208 Third, lower federal courts have closed
the door on constitutional scrutiny of individual possession of firearms
by concluding, based on a misinterpretation of Miller, that there is no
individual right to keep and bear arms. 20 9
As was demonstrated in the preceding sections, the Framers of the
Constitution intended to vest the right to keep and bear arms in individ-
uals and not the states.2 10 Therefore, lower courts have erred in stray-
ing from the portion of the Miller opinion recognizing an individual
right to keep and bear arms. 2 1 1 The Miller Court relied on the legisla-
tive history of the Second Amendment in interpreting the Amendment's
scope.2 12 Miller held that the Framers only intended the Second
Amendment to ensure the maintenance of a well-regulated militia as
that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states. The incorporation
doctrine states that only those rights that are fundamental are incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment and thus apply to the states. See Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1960) (omitting Second Amendment from list of rights
incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment). For a critical discussion of the in-
corporation doctrine, see Levinson, supra note 8, at 652-54. Whether the view
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Second Amendment is
correct or not is beyond the scope of this Comment. Furthermore, it is irrele-
vant to this proposed constitutional analysis. If the Supreme Court determines
that the Second Amendment does apply to the states, the analysis proposed in
this section will apply equally to state legislation. Therefore, it is not necessary
to analyze state gun control legislation independently.
207. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
208. Id. at 178. The Miller Court held that the Second Amendment only
protects possession of those weapons with "some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Id. The Court stated that
the weapon prohibited by the federal statute at issue, a sawed-off shotgun, did
not fall within that description. Id. For further discussion of Miller, see supra
notes 8 & 22-30 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that Second Amendment only guarantees state's right to arm organized mili-
tia). For a discussion of federal case law on the Second Amendment, see supra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text. The Miller Court defined "militia" as the
entire male population. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. The Court stated that the militia
was to be armed by the civilian population itself. Id. Notwithstanding this hold-
ing, federal courts have concluded that Miller limited the right to keep and bear
arms to a state's right. See, e.g., Stevens, 440 F.2d at 144 (interpreting Second
Amendment as protecting states' right to arm militia).
210. See, e.g., Pennsylvanian III, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 122, at 1778-79 (reporting Toench Coxe's statement that right to keep and
bear arms is individual right). For a discussion of the Framers' intent regarding
the right to keep and bear arms, see supra notes 45-202 and accompanying text.
211. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. For a discussion of cases misinterpreting the
Miller opinion, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
212. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177.
1446 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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provided for in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution. 21 3
Thus, the Miller Court stated that the Second Amendment only pro-
tected the right to keep and bear arms having "some reasonable rela-
tionship to the preservation . . . of a well regulated militia." 214
However, if the Miller holding were followed to its logical conclusion,
and each individual were allowed to keep and bear the types of arms
used by the modern military, the result would be terrifying. Taken to
this extreme, for example, each individual would have the right to keep
and bear nuclear weapons. 215
The courts have avoided this result by interpreting Miller as only
protecting the state's right to keep and bear arms, and not the individ-
ual's right to keep modern day weapons. 2 16 As a result, the scope of
constitutional limitation on the federal government's power to limit the
right of individuals to keep and bear arms has never been analyzed
under modern principles of constitutional review. The purpose of this
section is to develop a constitutional analysis of federal gun control leg-
islation, such as the proposed Brady Bill, assuming an individual right to
bear arms.
A constitutional analysis of federal or state legislation must begin by
determining whether there exists a right entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. 21 7 Next, one must examine the types of considerations that
might warrant governmental restriction of that right.21 8 If there are
considerations warranting restriction of a constitutional right, one must
determine whether a court should apply strict scrutiny to governmental
actions that appear to infringe upon that right.2 19 Under modern con-
stitutional principles, courts will give active protection to rights consid-
ered fundamental to individual liberties as reflected by history and by
interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court.2 20 The
Supreme Court has found only a limited group of fundamental rights.
213. Id. Under the Court's holding, in order for possession of a weapon to
be protected under the Second Amendment, a weapon must be "part of the
ordinary military equipment or ... contribute to the common defense." Id. at
178. The Court limited the purpose of the militia to providing for the national
defense. Id.
214. Id. at 178.
215. For a discussion of federal case law recognizing the undesirable results
of Miller, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. See also Levinson, supra
note 8, at 654-55.
216. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 144 (6th Cir. 1971).
217. TRIBE, supra note 204, at 779.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 780.
220. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 465. In their treatise, authors Nowak,
Rotunda and Young contend that "the Court has continually sought to enforce
those natural law rights which the justices believed were essential in American
society." Id. at 361.
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For example, the Court has held that the right to marry,2 2 ' vote, 22 2 and
the right to interstate travel are fundamental rights. 22 3 The Court has
reasoned that these rights are so essential to the individual liberties in
our society that they justify strict review of the acts of other branches of
government that infringe upon them. 224 Thus, the Court will uphold a
law that restricts fundamental rights only if the law is necessary to pro-
mote a compelling or overriding governmental interest. 22 5
In conducting a constitutional analysis of the Second Amendment,
the first step is to determine the scope of the right that it guarantees,
and whether the Court would consider that right to be fundamental. 2 26
As was discussed in the preceding sections, the Framers of the Second
Amendment articulated two essential purposes for the right to keep and
bear arms. 2 27 First, by providing for an armed citizenry, the Framers
felt that they could avoid the necessity of forming a standing army to
defend the nation. 228 Second, if Congress were to form a select military
force, whether a select militia or a standing army, the people as a whole
would have a means of defense against that force in the event that the
federal government attempted to use the national military force against
the people. 229 The Framers considered both of these purposes essential
221. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978) (declaring marriage
is fundamental right and striking down statute forbidding marriage by persons
who did not comply with court order for child support); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (finding that marriage is fundamental right and racial classifica-
tions relating to marriage are prohibited unless state meets "heavy burden of
justification").
222. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (holding that right to
vote is fundamental).
223. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (holding that right to
interstate travel occupies position "fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union").
224. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 465.
225. Id. at 351. Compare Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)
(holding state law imposing burdensome requirements on new political parties
to get candidates on election ballot violated Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment because it impaired freedom of association of affected par-
ties and was not justified by compelling state interest) with American Party of
Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 776-83 & n.14 (1974) (upholding requirement that
new political parties or candidates demonstrate public support to get on ballot
because it furthered compelling state interest in preventing elections from be-
coming unmanageable).
226. TRIBE, supra note 204, at 779.
227. For a discussion of the purposes of the right to keep and bear arms,
see supra notes 45-202 and accompanying text.
228. See Virginia Debates, reprinted in 3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 76, at
425. For a discussion of the Framers' fear of standing armies and the use of the
militia to avoid the formation of standing armies, see supra notes 62-202 and
accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Federal Farmer XVIII, supra note 175, reprinted in LETrERS FROM
THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 124. The Federal Farmer believed that
the general populace needed to possess arms to avoid the formation of a select
body of military men, against which the populace would be defenseless. Id. For
1448
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to the preservation of the people's liberty. Today, the United States has
both a standing army and a select militia. Thus, the first purpose of the
Second Amendment has failed.2 30 However, the Amendment's second
purpose, that the people should be able to take up arms to defend them-
selves against abuse of the federal army and the National Guard, is still
valid. 23 '
Because the second purpose of the Amendment is valid and de-
serves review, the next issue is whether the right to keep and bear arms
should be considered a fundamental right. 23 2 The previous sections
demonstrated that there is no doubt that the Framers considered the
right of the people to keep and bear arms to be among the most funda-
mental of all rights when the Second Amendment was adopted. 23 3 This
right was the people's last line of defense against attempts by the gov-
ernment to deprive. them of their liberty.2 34 However, individual rights
a discussion of the militia's role in protecting against a standing army, see supra
notes 88-94 & 152-82 and accompanying text.
230. Professor Rohner suggested that because the militia referred to in the
Second Amendment no longer exists, the Second Amendment is obsolete. Roh-
ner, supra note 8, at 72. This view, however, fails to recognize the second over-
riding purpose of the right to keep and bear arms-defending the people against
abuse by a federal army.
231. See, e.g., Federal Farmer XVIII, supra note 175, reprinted in LETTERS FROM
THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 100, at 124 (warning that people needed to be
armed to protect themselves against select body of militia). Commentators have
disagreed on the issue of whether the right to bear arms as a means of defending
against tyranny is a valid idea in modern society. Professor Levin contended
that the Framers intended the right to keep and bear arms to maintain a military
balance between the government and the people. Levin, supra note 63, at 166.
He noted, however, that the possibility of maintaining this military balance had
"become smaller as society has become more complex and warfare more de-
structive." Id. Therefore, he argued, the right to bear arms has become "more
futile, meaningless, and dangerous." Id. at 167.
On the other hand, another commentator implied that an unarmed popula-
tion presents an invitation for oppressive government conduct. Levinson, supra
note 8, at 656. Professor Levinson noted that "[t]he American political tradition
is, for good or ill, based in large measure on a healthy mistrust of the state." Id.
He cited the suppression of Chinese students in Tianamen Square as a recent
example of a tyrannical government trampling the rights of an unarmed popula-
tion. Id. at 656-57. Professor Levinson also pointed out that the citizens of
Northern Ireland have successfully used small arms against the sophisticated
military weaponry of Great Britain. Id. at 657. Professor Levinson contended
that, while times and weapons have changed since the Framers adopted the Sec-
ond Amendment, there are still instances when an armed population is neces-
sary to ward off government aggression. Id. He explained that this need can be
satisfied without giving individuals the right to keep and bear the same type of
sophisticated weaponry used by the military. Id. For these reasons, Professor
Levinson asserted that the Second Amendment should not be dismissed summa-
rily. Id.
232. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 465.
233. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 150, at 295 (James
Madison) (stating that government could not deprive armed populace of its
liberty).
234. Id.
43
Wagner: Gun Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: T
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
today have more protection. The Supreme Court has taken an active
role in ensuring the continuing vitality of individual rights.2 3 5 In addi-
tion, groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union exist solely to
protect the liberty of the people. Americans are much further removed
from despotism than they were in 1776, and, as a result, the second pur-
pose of the Second Amendment arguably may be obsolete.
Nonetheless,just as James Madison and George Mason could never
have comprehended Americans living in harmony with a standing army
and a select militia, it is impossible for us to predict how long that har-
mony will last. One could thus argue that because of the unknown dan-
gers of a standing army, a compelling governmental purpose must
justify any measure that restricts the right to keep and bear arms. 23 6
If the Supreme Court adopts this latter view, the next step in deter-
mining the permissible scope of federal gun control legislation is to as-
certain the interest of the government in enacting legislation, such as
the Brady Bill, that infringes upon the fundamental right to keep and
bear arms. 23 7 The overriding purpose of the Brady Bill is to decrease
the incidents of violent crime involving the use of firearms. 2 38 One
must determine whether decreasing incidents of violent crime furthers a
compelling government interest such that the means used to serve the
interest will survive strict scrutiny.2 39
235. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (holding right to
vote is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding right to
marry is basic civil right deserving of strict scrutiny); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (holding right to interstate travel occupies position funda-
mental to concept of federal union); see also NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 351
(discussing Supreme Court's protection of fundamental rights). If the law re-
stricts a fundamental right, the Court will uphold it only if it is necessary to
promote a compelling or overriding government interest. See, e.g., American
Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 776-83 & n.14 (1974) (upholding require-
ment that new political parties or candidates demonstrate public support to get
on ballot because it furthered compelling state interest in preventing elections
from becoming unmanageable).
236. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 465. One may argue that the deter-
mination of whether a right is fundamental should not depend on the likelihood
that its exercise will be necessary to preserve liberty. See id. at 366 (contending
that fundamental rights are those that are essential in American society).
Rather, the fundamental nature of a right should depend on the importance of
its exercise to individual liberty if and when it becomes necessary to exercise that
right. See id. Specifically, while the safeguards of individual liberty have consist-
ently increased since the adoption of the Second Amendment, the right to keep
and bear arms probably remains the only effective means of warding off govern-
mental abuse of military power. Therefore, legislation that restricts the Second
Amendment right to bear arms should be subject to strict scrutiny. For a discus-
sion of Professor Levinson's view on the continuing validity of the Second
Amendment as a means of warding off military aggression, see supra note 231.
237. TRIBE, supra note 204, at 779.
238. Biskupic, supra note 2, at 604. For a discussion of the purposes of the
Brady Bill, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
239. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 465.
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A. Prevention of Violent Crimes Involving Firearms Furthers a Compelling
Governmental Interest
The number of murders committed by criminals with guns jumped
from 5,015 in 1965 to 10,379 in 1972.240 In 1990, 20,045 murders were
committed in the United States; 12,847 with firearms. 2 4 1 In addition to
homicides, twenty-three percent of all aggravated assaults committed in
1990 were committed with firearms. 24 2 These statistics demonstrate
that the federal government can protect health and human life by enact-
ing legislation aimed at limiting the volume of violent crime committed
with firearms. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the protec-
tion of health and human life are compelling government interests. 243
This Comment now turns to an examination of whether the government
can enact legislation restricting the right to keep arms without violating
the Second Amendment.
B. Strict Scrutiny of Federal Gun Control Legislation
Of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, two are written with-
out qualification: the First Amendment freedom of speech and the Sec-
ond Amendment right to keep and bear arms.24 4 Despite the literal lack
240. Weatherup, supra note 10, at 961 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1974, at 151
(95th ed. 1974)). Mr. Weatherup also noted that in New York City in 1973,
there were only 28,000 lawfully possessed handguns. Id. The Treasury Depart-
ment estimated that over 1,300,000 were possessed illegally. Id. (citing Michael
T. Kaufman, Illegal Market in Pistols Found Here, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1973, § 1, at
1, col. 5.
241. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crime in the
United States, in UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1990, at 12 (1991) [hereinafter UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS]. From 1986 through 1989 there were an average of
18,536 murders committed per year; of these, an average of 11,180 per year
were committed with firearms. Id.
242. Id., in UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 241, at 24. This reflects a
14% increase from the number of aggravated assaults committed with firearms
in 1989. Id.
243. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519-20
(1989) (holding state has compelling interest in protecting life of viable fetus
and in determining point of viability); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506,
510-11 (1983) (finding that after first trimester, state interest in woman's health
is sufficiently compelling to justify regulations regarding woman's choice to have
abortion). But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that during
first trimester, state interest in mother's life and life of unborn fetus is not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify state regulation of abortion).
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. amend.
II ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" (empha-
sis added)). Compare the right to free speech and the right to keep and bear
arms with the other rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Constitu-
tion. The government is barred only from "prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I. On its face the First Amendment leaves room
for the regulation of religious exercise. Id. Moreover, the First Amendment
only gives the people the right to assemble "peaceably." Id. The Third Amend-
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of qualification, however, the rights guaranteed by these amendments
may still be subject to some regulatory measures.2 45 In Konigsberg v.
State Bar,24 6 Justice Harlan stated:
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and
association . . . , as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, are "absolutes," not only in the undoubted
sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must
prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection
must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First
Amendment. 24 7
Justice Harlan proposed that when "constitutional protections are as-
serted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation
must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of
the respective interests involved."'2 48 This same balancing test should
ment only prohibits the quartering of soldiers in a manner not "prescribed by
law." U.S. CONST. amend. III. The Fourth Amendment only protects people
from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The
Fourth Amendment also requires only that warrants not be issued without prob-
able cause. Id. The Fifth Amendment's blanket protection of life, liberty and
property only guarantees that the same will not be deprived "without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under the Sixth Amendment, fact findings
of a jury may not be reviewed by the courts other "than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Finally, only "excessive" bail and
fines and "cruel and unusual" punishment are prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For further discussion of the First Amend-
ment's absolute mandate, see NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 838-39.
245. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (holding that inquiries
about bar applicant's membership in Communist Party were constitutional).
246. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
247. Id. at 49 (citation omitted). Justice Harlan noted two instances in
which "freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk." Id. at
50. First, "certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts," are outside
the scope of the First Amendment. Id. Second, statutes that are not intended to
control the content of speech, but incidentally limit its "unfettered exercise,"
are not within the scope of the First Amendment's prohibition when they "are
justified by subordinating valid governmental interests." Id. at 50-51.
248. Id. at 51. Justice Black dissented, arguing that "the First Amend-
ment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of
free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did
all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field." Id. at 61 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). A majority of the Court, however, adopted Justice Harlan's balancing test.
Id. at 50-51.
The Supreme Court has qualified Konigsberg's holding that bar examiners
may inquire into an applicant's membership in political organizations. See Baird
v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (holding that views and beliefs are
immune from bar association inquisitions); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 27-28
(1971) (holding that requiring that bar applicants answer questions regarding
memberships in various clubs and organizations is unconstitutional under First
Amendment). Nonetheless, the Court continues to balance First Amendment
protection against governmental interests in regulation. See, e.g., New York State
Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988) (finding state's
interest in eradicating discrimination outweighs minimal impact of law forbid-
1452 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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also apply to governmental infringement on the right to keep and bear
arms.
The government has a compelling interest in enacting legislation
designed to protect human life by decreasing criminal activity involving
firearms.2 4 9 Nonetheless, in determining whether gun control legisla-
tion is constitutional, a court must balance the government's interest
against the people's fundamental right to keep and bear arms. 2 50
The Brady Bill would impose a seven-day waiting period on poten-
tial handgun purchasers. 2 5 1 The apparent purpose of the bill is to iden-
tify felons at the point of sale.2 5 2 A large percentage of violent crimes
are committed with firearms, and a large number of violent crime of-
fenders have prior felony records.2 53 By decreasing the number of
felons with firearms, the government hopes to decrease the number of
firearms used in violent crimes. Because preventing convicted felons
ding discriminatory membership policies on First Amendment rights); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-67 (1980) (weighing interests in protecting privacy in
home and providing special protection for labor protesters against First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of other protesters); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 99-100 (1972) (considering law infringing exercise of First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights in light of state interests in preventing disruptions at
schools). For further discussion of the Konigsberg case, see NOWAK ET AL., supra
note 205, at 838-40.
249. For a discussion of the government's compelling interest in decreasing
criminal activity involving firearms, see supra notes 240-43 and accompanying
text.
250. For a discussion of the people's fundamental right to keep and bear
arms, see supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
251. H.R. 277, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
252. Id. (requiring criminal background check of handgun purchaser before
purchase is allowed). The Brady Bill does not itself prohibit the possession of
firearms. Id. Felons are prohibited from possessing firearms under the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988).
The Brady Bill merely allows gun vendors an opportunity to identify felons and
thus avoid selling them guns. H.R. 277, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(l)(A). For
further discussion of the Brady Bill, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
253. See Crime in the United States, in UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note
241, at 12. For a discussion of the connection between the use of firearms and
violent crimes, see supra notes 240- 43 and accompanying text. In 1979, Justice
Department estimates showed that one-third of all violent offenders had prior
convictions for a violent offense. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 103 (2d ed. 1988).
Moreover, of the persons released from state prisons in 1983, approximately
77% had been arrested in the past, or were re-arrested after release, for com-
mission of a violent offense. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC, ATLAS AND YEAR-
BOOK 827 (44th ed. 1991). In 1988, among all persons arrested for murder in
the 75 largest counties in the United States, 49% had prior convictions. BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE
STATISTICS 440 (1990). Twenty-nine percent of these convictions were for felo-
nies. Id. Of those arrested for assault in the same counties, 46% had prior con-
victions-3 1% for felonies. Id. Finally, among all of those arrested for
committing violent offenses in those counties, 50% had prior records-34% for
felonies. Id.
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from obtaining firearms directly furthers the goal of decreasing the
number of violent crimes committed with firearms, the Brady Bill ap-
pears to be within the scope of the government's legitimate purpose for
firearm regulation.
254
254. Constitutional analysis of the Brady Bill, however, cannot end with the
Second Amendment. The Brady Bill, when combined with the prohibition of
felon ownership of firearms under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, treats convicted felons differently than law-abiding citizens. See
H.R. 277, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Therefore, a court may also scrutinize
the Brady Bill under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
While the Equal Protection Clause appears only in the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause applies equal protection standards to the fed-
eral government. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979) (holding
gender classifications denying equal protection are actionable under Fifth
Amendment).
Generally, the government may enact laws that treat similarly situated peo-
ple differently as long as the disparate treatment is reasonably related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 174-76 (1980) (holding Court will not invalidate social and economic
legislation on equal protection grounds unless it has no rational relationship to
governmental objective); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (find-
ing that Equal Protection Clause is only offended if classification rests on
grounds "wholly irrelevant" to achievement of state's objective). Furthermore,
the Court will apply strict scrutiny only if the class of individuals treated ad-
versely is a suspect class, or if the right that is deprived is a fundamental right.
Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (prohibiting racial classifications
unless "heavy burden ofjustification" met) with Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (compelling interest can justify racial classification). See
NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 852 (discussing Supreme Court's application of
strict scrutiny test).
For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court applied the Equal
Protection Clause to a case involving a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978). The Zablocki Court considered a law forbidding
marriage by those persons not in compliance with a court order to support their
children. Id. The Court declared the law invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause even though the law did not apply to a suspect classification because the
law treated people unequally with respect to the fundamental right to marry. Id.
This author proposes that felons are not a suspect class deserving of height-
ened constitutional protection. The Court has determined that classifications
based on mental retardation, poverty and age are not suspect. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding
mental retardation is not suspect classification); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
323 (1980) (finding poverty standing alone is not suspect classification); Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (holding age
is not suspect classification). The Court is not likely to hold that one's status as a
convicted felon is suspect, while classifications based on mental retardation,
poverty and age are not. Moreover, the Court has outlined the indicia of suspect
classes: 1) the class is determined by immutable characteristics; 2) there is a
history of discrimination against that class; and 3) the class is politically power-
less. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974). The class of felons
fails to meet the first criterion on this list. One becomes a convicted felon due to
actions of his or her own accord; it is not an immutable characteristic.
However, although felons are not a suspect class, the Court may accord
strict scrutiny to legislation restricting a felon's right to possess firearms because
the Court may find that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right.
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Constitutional analysis of the proposed legislation does not end
here. In order to pass constitutional muster, the government must util-
ize the least restrictive burden on the legitimate possession of firearms
in accomplishing its goal.2 55 The Brady Bill very likely meets this stan-
dard. The current version of the bill would require law-abiding citizens
to wait only seven days before obtaining possession of a handgun, a
minimal burden on the right to bear arms.2 56 Furthermore, the Brady
Bill is keenly crafted to achieve its purpose. The bill requires the police
to check the background of potential handgun purchasers during the
waiting period. 25 7 This requirement is probably the most direct and ef-
fective means of preventing felons from purchasing firearms. 2 58 In sum,
the Brady Bill would impose only minimal burdens on the right of law-
abiding citizens to keep and bear arms while directly furthering a com-
pelling state interest. 25 9
A more interesting analysis results from the proposed ban on as-
The Court will examine carefully the connection between the possession of fire-
arms by convicted felons and death and injury resulting from violent crime. For
a discussion of the balance between the government's compelling interest in
protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and an individual's fundamental
right to bear arms, see supra notes 203- 43 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right, see supra notes
226-36 and accompanying text.
255. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (noting that when gov-
ernment establishes compelling interest in restricting constitutional right, "that
[interest] cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legisla-
tive abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same basic purpose."). In Shelton, the Supreme Court held that legislation
restricting a constitutional right cannot be so broad that it interferes unnecessa-
rily with that right. Id.; see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1983) (invali-
dating statute prohibiting all distribution of literature without license because
statute went beyond means necessary to meet government objectives). These
cases concerned challenges under the First Amendment. However, because the
Second Amendment also guarantees a fundamental right, the Court should ap-
ply this same standard to Second Amendment challenges to gun control
legislation.
256. H.R. 277, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii).
257. Id.
258. House Bill 3371 contained a provision requiring state to replace the
five-day waiting period with an instantaneous background check once the tech-
nology for such instantaneous checks became available. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991). However, a more recent version of the bill does not contain
such a provision. See H.R. 277, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
259. Notably, the initial House version of the bill, would be less likely to
pass constitutional scrutiny. The initial House bill did not require a background
check. Biskupic, Brady Compromise, supra note 4, at 1757. Therefore, the current
version of the bill would probably be more effective than the House bill at actu-
ally preventing felons from obtaining firearms. By ignoring this potential ave-
nue for decreasing the burden on law-abiding citizens' right to bear arms, the
initial House bill did not use the least burdensome methods to achieve the gov-
ernment's goal.
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sault weapons contained in a recent version of the Senate bill. 260 Under
the previously proposed ban, all assault weapons would be outlawed in
all circumstances. 2 6' While the same balancing test applies here as for
the waiting period, the assault weapon ban imposes a much heavier bur-
den on individual rights. The only burden the Brady Bill would place on
Second Amendment rights is a seven-day waiting period to purchase a
handgun.2 62 By contrast, the assault weapon ban would deprive law-
abiding citizens of the right to possess an entire class of firearms. 2 63
Therefore, in order to analyze the assault weapon legislation, one must
determine if the government can completely deny the people possession
of an entire class of firearms.
Banning private possession of sophisticated military weaponry, such
as nuclear weapons, can easily be justified by the government's compel-
ling interest in maintaining political stability and national security, thus
protecting all of the individual liberties that the Constitution guaran-
tees. 2 64 One could argue, however, that individual possession of assault
weapons does not pose a threat to the national security. The military
could easily suppress a few radical groups who owned assault weapons.
By contrast, assault weapons would create a tremendous advantage for
an oppressed population if the military became the aggressor. Thus,
when balancing the government's interest in maintaining political stabil-
ity and the people's Second Amendment rights, individual rights must
prevail when dealing with assault weapon legislation. The government
must have a compelling interest other than avoiding violent insurrec-
tions to justify an absolute ban on assault weapons. 2 65
260. Biskupic, Senate Bill, supra note 4, at 2102. For a discussion of the Sen-
ate's 1991 crime control bill, which includes a ban on nine classifications of as-
sault weapons, see supra note 4. A state ban on assault weapons was recently
challenged in federal court on Second Amendment grounds in Fresno Rifle &
Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1990). The Fresno
court upheld the law. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the
continued adherence of federal courts to the view that the Second Amendment
does not apply to the states. Id. at 1417-19.
261. See Biskupic, Senate Bill, supra note 4, at 2102.
262. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
263. Biskupic, Senate Bill, supra note 4, at 2130.
264. Under the Second Amendment, individuals have the right to keep and
bear arms to defend themselves against the organized military should the gov-
ernment abuse its power to regulate that military. Thus, one could argue that
the Second Amendment guarantees possession of almost any weapon because
almost any weapon would reasonably contribute to this purpose. However, pri-
vate possession of tactical weaponry such as nuclear missiles and war planes
could enable any radical group to threaten our government and, therefore, our
liberty. Thus, a court would probably find that the government has a compelling
interest in maintaining its political structure and defending against violent rebel-
lion by radical groups. Without such security, all individual liberties would be
meaningless. Therefore, the government can bar individual possession of weap-
ons that pose an imminent threat to the national security, notwithstanding the
impact on Second Amendment rights.
265. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 205, at 351.
1456 [Vol. 37: p. 1407
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On the other hand, assault weapons are often used and are particu-
larly destructive in the commission of violent crimes. 2 66 Thus, the gov-
ernment's interest in limiting the use of assault weapons is even more
compelling than its interest limiting the use of more conventional weap-
ons. In addition, banning assault weapons would not completely de-
prive the people of an effective means of defending against military
abuse. 26 7 One commentator has pointed out that the people of North-
ern Ireland have made extremely effective use of small arms against the
sophisticated weaponry of Great Britain.268 Thus, depriving the people
of the possession of assault weapons may be justified by the govern-
ment's interest in controlling the use of assault weapons to commit vio-
lent crimes. One may also contend that a ban on such weapons would
decrease the people's ability to resist military oppression to such a de-
gree that a ban is not justified by the government's interests. Which of
these views is "constitutionally correct" depends on one's opinion as to
the types of arms that are necessary to repel military aggression.
It is unclear what result the Supreme Court would reach with re-
spect to legislation such as the Senate's proposed ban of assault weap-
ons. The Second Amendment, however, does not ban all governmental
regulation of firearms. Therefore, as long as the Brady Bill or other gun
control legislation meets the standards of modem constitutional review,
the Supreme Court should uphold the law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have avoided constitutional review of gun control
legislation by adopting the fiction that the Second Amendment only
grants to the states the right to arm their militia. 2 69 A historical analysis
of the debates surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment,
266. L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr., Time to Assault Weapons, A.B.A.J., May 1990, at
8, 8. Mr. Chauvin reports that "an assault gun is twenty times more likely to be
used in crime than a conventional firearm." Id.; see also Judith Bonderman &
Dennis A. Hennigan, Paying the Bill For Violence, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 28, 1991, 13, 13-
14 (reporting Cox Newspapers survey showing that assault weapons are 20 times
more likely than conventional firearms to be used in criminal activity; 25 times
more likely to be used in drug crimes). Mr. Chauvin states that in recent years,
the use of assault weapons in crime has increased by 78%. Chauvin, supra, at 8.
The National Law Journal recently reported a 1989 incident in which five chil-
dren were killed and 29 wounded when a gunman armed with an assault rifle
opened fire at a playground. Bonderman & Hennigan, supra, at 13. The reason
assault weapons are more popular with criminals is that they have features such
as a large ammunition capacity, rapid fire capability, and ease of concealment.
Id. at 14.
267. See Levinson, supra note 8, at 656-57 (citing people's use of small arms
and other weapons in Northern Ireland and territories occupied by Israel).
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th. Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that there is no individual right to keep and bear arms). For a discussion of
these federal court decisions, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
COMMENT 14571992]
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however, proves that the Framers of the Constitution intended the Sec-
ond Amendment to grant an individual right to keep and bear arms. 2 70
The intended purposes of Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms are twofold. 27 1 First, an armed population could provide for civil
defense of the nation, thus avoiding the necessity of a standing army.2 72
Second, the people in possession of arms could defend themselves
against oppression by an organized military, if one were ever formed. 2 73
The first purpose for the Second Amendment is now moot because
the United States maintains an organized military to defend the nation.
The second purpose still retains its vitality as a last line of defense
against military oppression; it is not, however, necessarily a blanket
guarantee to possess all types of weapons. Today, the Second Amend-
ment simply ensures that any attempt of the federal government to reg-
ulate the possession of firearms will be subject to strict constitutional
scrutiny. 274
Under modem principals of constitutional review, legislation that
serves the government's compelling interest in protecting human life
will be upheld as long as that interest outweighs the legislation's impact
on Second Amendment rights, and the means chosen to further the gov-
ernment's interest are narrowly tailored to further that interest. 27 5 Us-
ing this balancing test one can argue that the government's interest in
preventing violent crimes involving firearms is so compelling that the
government can regulate the possession of all firearms, except to the
extent that such regulation would leave the people completely defense-
less against the military. This approach leaves ample room for legisla-
tion requiring waiting periods and criminal background checks before a
handgun can be purchased, legislation regulating the possession of fire-
arms by felons, and legislation banning possession of all firearms that
would pose a threat to the national security.
The Supreme Court should take the next opportunity that arises to
270. For a discussion of the debates surrounding the adoption of the Sec-
ond Amendment, see supra notes 83-202 and accompanying text.
271. For a discussion of the purposes of the Second Amendment, see supra
notes 83-202 and accompanying text.
272. For a discussion of the role of the armed population, see supra notes
101-02 & 170-76 and accompanying text.
273. For a discussion of using the armed populace to avoid formation of a
standing army, see supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
274. Because the only fundamental purpose for the right to keep and bear
arms today is to guarantee the people a means of defense against military op-
pression, the government is free to regulate all other uses of firearms so long as
the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. For a
discussion of the government's interest in regulating the possession of firearms,
see supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. Therefore, there is no constitu-
tional obstacle to legislation regulating the use of arms for purposes such as
hunting and self-defense.
275. For a proposed constitutional analysis of the Second Amendment
right to bear arms, see supra notes 203-68 and accompanying text.
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reverse the long line of cases denying any individual right to keep and
bear arms. As soon as this is done, a line of case law should develop that
will set the parameters for permissible gun control regulation, as has
been the case with all other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. Such parameters must be based in strict scrutiny jurispru-
dence, and not in the judicial fiction of the absence of an individual right
to keep and bear arms that has little support in the history of the Second
Amendment.
Jay R. Wagner
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